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COMMENT
CHANGING CONFIGURATIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW:
JUDGE POSNER'S APPLICATIONS OF HIS ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS TO ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
When Congress promulgated the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,' the
federal judiciary became the guardian of a major doctrine of American
economic policy. 2 The policy underlying the Sherman Act, and reaffirmed
by subsequent antitrust statutes,3 is that the American economy shall remain
distinctly competitive.' Considering the pivotal role that competition assumes
in antitrust law, it seems logical that a clear definition of the term should
exist. Ironically, however, Congress failed to provide such a definition, and
judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act remain devoid of any coherent

1, Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
This Comment focuses on sections 1 and 2 of the current statute, which provide in pertinent part:
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony ...
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign states, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony ...
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966)
("[w]e have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic
policy"). Because the § I prohibition of restraints in trade and the §2 prohibition of monopolization are extremely broad, the "Sherman Act may be little more than a legislative command
that the judiciary develop a common law of antitrust." P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS
104,
at 5 (3d ed. 1981).
3. Since the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress has enacted two principal
antitrust statutes: the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976)), and the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)), both adopted in 1914. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act states that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce . . . are hereby
declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 43 (1976). The Clayton Act proscribes price discrimination
(§ 2), sales on condition that the buyer cease dealing with the seller's competitors (§ 3), and
certain corporate mergers (§ 7) "where the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition ...... 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("[t]he Sherman
Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade").
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definition.' Nevertheless, throughout the history of antitrust law, competition has served as the standard for resolving legal claims that are brought
6
under the antitrust statutes.
The complexity posed by this judicial standard stems from the values
associated with a competitive capitalistic economy. The belief that competition will benefit both individuals and society is fundamental to American
liberal thought. The ideological foundation for this belief is articulated in
Adam Smith's profound intellectual achievement, The Wealth of Nations.7
The cardinal tenet of this book's exposition on classical liberalism is that
a free and unfettered market, consisting of a multitude of small competitors,
will channel individual productive energies and resources toward their most
valuable uses.' Smith's reliance on market competition is based on the view
that individual self-interest 9 in producing for profit will lead to quality
products designed to meet consumer needs.'" By achieving social welfare
5. For a development of the various themes of competition recognized by the Supreme
Court, see infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
6. Because § 1 of the Sherman Act literally prohibits every agreement in restraint of trade,
traditional antitrust doctrine contains two tests which are applied by the courts to determine
if a particular restraint is in the interest of competition. The first test is the "rule of reason,"
which requires the court to determine "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also infra
notes 157-61 and accompanying text. The second test is "per se illegality," under which the
court classifies "certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see
infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
7. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(Modern Library ed. 1937) (1st ed. London 1776).
8. In Smith's words, each producer
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner
as its produce may be of greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that
it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that
of society more effectively than when he really intends to promote it.
A. SMITH, supra note 7, at 423.
9. Smith wrote that "[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." Id. at 14.
The classical liberalist view of human nature is that man is a rational maximizer of his selfish
interests. Jeremy Bentham, a philosopher in the classical mode, believed that all human actions
were motivated by the desire to achieve pleasure and avoid pain. See J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in ETHICAL THEORIES 341 (A.I. Melden ed.
1955). Although motives stem from pleasure and pain, rational assessment of a given situation

determines which pleasures and pains are sought or avoided. For a discussion of individual
rationalization as a behavioral presupposition in economic theory, see infra notes 228-29. For
an analysis of Smith's philosophical views and how they relate to his economic perceptions,
see Lerner, Introduction to A. SMITH, supra note 7.
10. "Every individual . . . continually exert[s] himself to find out the most advantageous
employment for whatever capital he can command." A. SMITH, supra note 7, at 421. The
political corollary of classical liberalism's economic creed is that a state which governs the
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through the diffusion of economic power, Adam Smith's "invisible hand"
of market competition "seemed to be the perfect counterpart of American
democratic pluralism."''
The confidence Americans placed in the classical liberal ideology was
shaken by the destructive consequences of the ruinous competition that
occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century." As a result of
relentless accumulations of industrial wealth by giant corporations and trusts,
many small competitors disappeared from the marketplace.' A feverish
hostility toward these newly emerging giants became prevalent throughout
American society. I' This public outcry was so predominant that by the 1888
presidential election every major political party had adopted an antitrust plank
in its platform.' 5 The political impulse behind the passage of the Sherman
Act-to preserve a climate of economic freedom-was definitive."
These political and economic realities of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries signified the apparent abandonment of classical liberal
economic theory. Yet, reemerging under a new school of economic thought
known as neoclassical economics,'" the theory has received further esoteric
and highly elaborate analytical treatment by contemporary microeconomic
price theorists.' 8 Under classical liberal economic theory, competition
least, governs the best. For an inquiry into classical liberalism's opposition to governmental
intervention in economic affairs, see H. GIRVETZ, THE EVOLUTION OF LIBERALISM 50-81 (1963).
11. Hofstader, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POuLTICS 188, 206 (1965).
12. The exploitive nature of the industrial warfare of this era is documented in M. JOSEPHSON,
THE ROBBER BARONS

(1934) and A.

NEVINS, THE

HEROIC

AGE OF AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

(1940).

13. See, e.g., J. Bain, Industrial Concentration and Anti-Trust Policy, in GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 619 (H. Williamson 2d ed. 1951) ("The scope of the merger movement
was so great that by 1904 . . . [300 large industrial combinations] controlled more than twofifths of the manufacturing capital of the country and had affected about four-fifths of important American industries.")
14. See, e.g., W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT

54-71 (1965). After noting that the "pervasive antitrust senti-

ment did not spring up overnight," the author concludes that in the years immediately preceding
the passage of the Sherman Act public sentiment demanded the dissipation of power held by
the trusts. Id. at 445.
15. Antitrust planks appeared on the platforms of the Union Labor Party, the Prohibition
Party, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party. Also, since 1880 the Greenbacks and
the Anti-Monopoly parties had campaigned against monopolies. In the 1888 election, the
Republican candidate, Benjamin Harrison, won the presidency. He was nominated by the
Republicans over Senator Sherman on the seventh ballot. See D. MCKEE, NATIONAL CONVEN-

192, 215, 224-53 (1901).
16. See, e.g., H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

TIONS AND PLATFORMS

POLICY

227 (1955) (characterizing the

Sherman Act as embodying an eminently " 'social' purpose ... [of] achieving freedom from
corruption and maintaining freedom of independent thinking in political life"). But see Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (concluding
that Congress had a uniform goal of promoting efficiency when it enacted the Sherman Act).
17. A major representative work of the neoclassicalists during the late nineteenth century
is W. JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871).
18. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R. QUANT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY (2d ed. 1977); J. QUIRK
& R. SAPOSNIK, INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND WELFARE ECONOMICS
(1968); P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (10th ed. 1974). Microeconomics
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represents a state of perfection in which society's material needs are fulfilled at the lowest possible cost and without a centralized planning
authority. 9 Two models lie at the foundation of these theories: perfect competition and pure monopoly.
The basic premise of the perfect competition model is that no individual
or entity possesses the ability to influence market conditions. The feasibility
of this premise depends upon the following assumptions contained in the
model: (1) the market features a large number of buyers and sellers; (2)
products are presumed to be standardized and, therefore, cannot be differentiated from other similar products; (3) collusion to influence market conditions is absent; (4) perfect knowledge about market conditions is possessed
by all competitors; and (5) freedom to enter into, and exit from, the market
results in the optimum allocation of productive resources." Based upon these
assumptions, firms must constantly reduce their costs in order to remain
viable competitors." When consumers and producers interact in this competitive market, the supply reaches a state of equilibrium with the quantity
demanded and, thus, provides consumers with the desired product at
minimum expense. 2
The antithesis of the perfect competition model is the pure monopoly

is the economics of individual enterprises, workers, and consumers. This is contrasted with
macroeconomics, which concentrates on the operation of the whole economy.
According to microeconomic price theory, prices in a competitive market are determined
by supply and demand. Demand is based on consumers' desires and incomes, while supply
is based on the cost of production. When supply equals demand, the market is in a state of
equilibrium. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 76 (3d ed. 1972). Such a process is efficient because it allocates scarce resources toward their most productive use. For an eloquent
introduction into the concepts of price theory, see G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed.
1966).
The core of neoclassical economics, and most microeconomic texts, is the notion that consumer demand is determined by the utility derived from each product. E. HUNT & H. SHERMAN, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADITIONAL AND RADICAL VIEWS 175 (1978). Utility
is defined as the satisfaction received from consumption. Id. Marginal utility represents the
effect each additional unit of the product has on the consumer, while the law of diminishing
marginal utility states that a good's marginal utility diminishes with additional acquisitions of
that product. Id. at 176. From this principle flows the notion that consumers spend in order
to maximize their satisfaction. The consumer will "maximize satisfaction or utility when income is spent so that the marginal or additional utility derived from the last unit of each
good purchased is exactly in proportion to the price paid for each good." Id. Similarly, the
firm is presumed to be motivated towards maximizing its profits in choosing between which
goods to produce and what raw materials to buy. P. SAMUELSON, supra note 18, at 88.
19. See, e.g., E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC
MODELS 18-22 (1968) (allocation of resources under perfect competition, known as Pareto
optimum, is based on the theory of marginal utility).
20. J. HENDERSON & R. QUANT, supra note 18, at 104; J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra
note 18, at 74-76.
21. See Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1, 6. At the
point of equilibrium, the successful firm has achieved its goal of profit maximization by producing the quantity that equates marginal cost and price.
22. J. HENDERSON & R. QUANT, supra note 18, at 103.
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model. Only one firm exists under the pure monopoly model; this firm faces
neither the threat of competitors entering the market nor close substitutes
for the goods it produces.23 Whereas a competitive firm faces a flat demand
curve because it must accept the prevailing market price, the monopolist
faces a downward sloping demand curve because it cannot sell all its output
at the existing market price.2" Additional sales may be obtained by the
monopolist only by lowering the price of its entire output. Consequently,
the monopolist will opt for a higher selling price and the reduction of output below the competitive level in order to maintain excess profits.25
A group of legal scholars and economists, classified as Chicago school
theorists,2 6 advocate resolving antitrust disputes according to the economic
implications that are derived from the foregoing models of the challenged
practices.27 The apparent appeal of this approach stems from the perceived
ability of microeconomics to provide an objectively quantifiable and valueneutral benchmark for the law. 2 Chicago school theorists have sharply
criticized legal decisions that apply noneconomic values to competition.29
23. E. SINGER, supra note 19, at 16-17.
24. The scope of this analysis is beyond the introductory comments presented here. For
a review of these economic principles, see generally E. HUNT & H. SHERMAN, supra note 18,
at 252-68 (an analysis of profit maximization, assumed to be the goal of all firms, is given
for competitive and monopolistic industries).
25. See R. LIPsEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMCS 25-53 (3d ed. 1972) (due to the fact that marginal
revenue is less than price, a monopolist must lower its price on all units sold in order to sell
an extra one; this will maximize profits by restricting output and setting price above marginal
cost).
26. The term "Chicago school" is used to identify scholars who advocate a strict economic
approach to antitrust law. See Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What
Are the Sources of Widsom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977). Included among
those economists associated with the University of Chicago who have adamantly supported
the virtues of economic capitalism are F.A. Hayek, Henry Simons, Frank Knight, and recent
Nobel laureate George J. Stigler. MCGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 91 (2d
ed. 1973). Milton Friedman, however, is the economist best known for his defense of capitalism

in terms of its political virtues. See M.

FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND

FREEDOM

(1962).

27. The most orthodox statement of the Chicago school approach to antitrust analysis is
found in R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). For other
representative works of Chicago school theory, see Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965); Bork, Vertical Integrationand the Sherman Act: The Legal History
of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Bowman, Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Director & Levi, Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 281 (1956); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?,
3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
28. See generally Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTA L. REV. 485
(1980) (some of the articles in the symposium consider efficiency to be a true guide to certainty
in antitrust law, while other articles find efficiency to be a value-based standard utilized only
to justify the status quo).
29. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) (critical of per se rule against vertical restraints);
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
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According to these theorists, the application of such values has been the

major cause of incoherence in antitrust doctrine and has often prompted
courts to proscribe economically procompetitive practices. 3"

The appointment of Professor Richard A. Posner to the United States
Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit brought to the bench a leading ad-

vocate of the Chicago school approach to antitrust law. 3 This Comment
will address some of the antitrust policies expressed in Seventh Circuit opinions in which Judge Posner either wrote for, or served as a member of,
the majority.32 These opinions are noteworthy for their positive correlation
with Judge Posner's previously articulated propositions on antitrust law.
Moreover, they indicate a possible progression by the Seventh Circuit toward
adopting the Chicago school approach.
Part one of this Comment develops the theme that the Seventh Circuit
is rapidly diminishing the scope of protection provided by section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Three decisions serve as the backdrop for this theme. In the
first case, In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation,33 the court addressed
the fundamental question of whether the plaintiff had standing to sue under
the antitrust laws. In construing a broadly worded statutory grant of
standing,3" the Seventh Circuit held that the Sherman Act applied only to

Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975) (critical
review of the Warren Court's deviation from economic theory and from reliance on concepts
of business autonomy and freedom of opportunity).
30. See Bork, The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 401, 415 (1967); Elzinga,
The Goods of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 1191, 1212 (1977); Flynn, Introduction: American Jurisprudence: A Symposium
on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182,
1185 (1977).
31. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) [HEREINAFTER CITED
AS R. POSNER, ECoNoMIc PERSPECTIVE]; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS (1974); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Per
Se Legality]; Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engineers
Decisions, 67 GEo. L.J. 1187 (1979); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, (1977) [hereinafter cited as Posner,
Reflections on Sylvania]; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger, and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court].
32. The cases evaluated in which Judge Posner wrote the majority opinion include the following: Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982); Omega Satellite
Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982); Marrese v. American Academy
of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982); Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc.
v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1980); Valley Liqours, Inc. v. Renfield
Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982). The case evaluated in which Judge Posner was
a member of the majority is the antitrust standing case of In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig.,
681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). Each of these cases was
decided by a three-judge panel.
33. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
34. Section 4 of the Clayton Act grants "[any person . . . injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" a right to sue in federal court.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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consumers or competitors within the area of the economy affected by the
alleged violation.35 The court further held that only those plaintiffs classified
as efficient enforcers of the law could claim its protection. 6 As this Comment will demonstrate, this constriction is inconsistent with Supreme Court
decisions emphasizing a liberal interpretation of the antitrust standing
provisions.
In the second case, Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons,37 the issue before the court was whether the district court had
violated its discretionary powers by holding the defendant in criminal contempt for failing to comply with a protective discovery order. The order
required the defendant to provide the plaintiffs with information relating
to denials of membership in the professional organization. Suing under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs alleged that the requested information was necessary for the effective preparation of their claim that they were
denied membership as a result of an illegal group boycott." The Seventh
Circuit overturned the contempt citation and held that the district court should
have ordered discovery to ascertain the anticompetitive effect before allowing
discovery on the issue of whether an illegal group boycott existed. 39 The
Marrese court speculated that by employing this sequence of discovery, the
case could have been dismissed for lack of anticompetitive effect."0 This Comment will criticize Marrese on two grounds: (1) the ruling improperly displaced
the district court's broad discretionary powers to oversee discovery procedures;
and (2) the decision conjecturally disposed of the substantive merits of the
plaintiff's antitrust claims.
In the third case, Valley Liquors, Inc. v., Renfield Importers, Ltd.," the
Seventh Circuit disregarded the established standard of review for preliminary
injunctions. Furthermore, as this Comment will illustrate, the Valley Liquors
court's implicit approval of the proposition that nonprice vertical market
restraints are presumptively legal is symbolic of Judge Posner's influence
on the court in the field of antitrust law.
Part two of this Comment examines the definition of competition in antitrust law. Judge Posner's pronouncements regarding what constitutes anticompetitive effect are shown to be deeply immersed in Chicago school theory.
This section also highlights the manner in which Judge Posner distinguishes
contrary Supreme Court declarations in order to promote his economic
presuppositions. The Seventh Circuit's reliance on a purely economic definition of competition indicates an ideological shift by the court toward embracing the Chicago school approach. In applying this definition to antitrust

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

681
Id.
692
Id.
Id.
Id.
678

F.2d at 519.
at 516, 519-20.
F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982).
at 1087.
at 1096.
at 1095.
F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982).
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doctrine, the court ignores deeply entrenched political and social values that
give the antitrust statutes their dynamic character.
THE DEMISE OF SECTION

A.
1.

1

OF THE SHERMAN ACT

Judicial Restrictions of Private Antitrust Suits

The Background of Antitrust Standing "

Section 4 of the Clayton Act 3 is a remedial provision which allows "any
person . . . injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to sue and, if successful, to recover treble
damages and attorneys' fees." Because this statutory provision is broadly
worded, courts have struggled to limit its scope45 without impairing the compensatory and deterrent objectives of private antitrust actions. 6 To accomplish
42. The standing issue involves whether the claimant is the proper party to maintain a private
antitrust suit and, thus, whether she will be allowed access to a federal forum to present her
case. Before a court will entertain a claimant's suit, two requirements must be met. First, it
must be shown that a federal court has jurisdiction over the claim as required by the "case
or controversy" mandate of article Ill of the United States Constitution. See 13 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3531, at 175
(1975). Second, a discretionary determination must be made as to whether, for reasons of judicial
economy, federal judicial resources should be devoted to the case. See Tyler, Private Antitrust
Litigation: The Problem of Standing, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 272-73 (1978).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
44. Id. Originally, the private right to recover treble damages was provided in § 7 of the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 210 (1890). This treble damage provision remains unchanged under § 4
of the Clayton Act. For an historical perspective of the standing doctrine in antitrust law,
see M. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER 265-333 (1956); Letwin, Congress and the

Sherman Antitrust Law: 1867-1890, 23 U. CMI. L. REV. 221 (1956); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE
L.J. 1010 (1952).
45. For comprehensive reviews of judicial decisions limiting § 4 of the Clayton Act, see
Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 813-45
(1977); Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 374, 375-91
(1976). The reason generally recognized for restricting private antitrust litigation is the classic
"floodgate" argument: courts would be overburdened with suits that conceivably could be brought
by any person who suffered, however remotely, an injury due to an antitrust violation. This
would "result in an over-kill, due to an enlargement of the private weapon to a caliber far
exceeding that contemplated by Congress." Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
46. For congressional recognition of the compensatory and deterrent objectives of § 4, see
51 CoNG. REC. 9,090 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell); id. at 9,185 (remarks of Rep. Helvering); id. at 9,239 (remarks of Sen. Reed). The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission are the primary enforcement agencies of the antitrust laws. Yet, these agencies
are understaffed and receive insufficient funding. See, e.g., M. GREEN, B. MOORE, JR. & B.
WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 122-30 (1972) (lack of resources decreases the

effectiveness of government antitrust enforcement). Furthermore, these agencies' prosecutorial
discretion leads to selective enforcement, thereby minimizing the range of antitrust violations
pursued. Tyler, supra note 42, at 277-80 (arguing that based upon the inability of government
agencies to prosecute most antitrust violations, the social deterrence function of private suits
should be recognized as the major objective of § 4). For additional discussion of the objectives
of private antitrust suits, see infra notes 63, 92 & 152.
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this result, the federal courts have devised several tests4 7 that restrict the
expansive liability that would flow from a literal interpretation of the statute.48
One test requires the plaintiff to prove that a "direct injury" resulted
from the alleged antitrust violation.4 9 A major shortcoming of the direct
injury approach is that it denies a claimant standing if another victim of
the antitrust violation has a more direct relationship with the alleged
violator."0 Rather than determining standing based upon the relationship between the named parties, many courts have adopted the "target area" test.
This approach focuses on the relationship between the claimant and the area
of the economy that has been affected by the alleged violation.' Never47. Commentators have recognized that these various tests have been applied inconsistently
among, and within, the federal circuits. As a result, antitrust standing decisions are rather
unpredictable. See generally Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV.
331, 331-35 (1974); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 820-35; Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust
Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1971).
48. Four policy considerations are generally recognized for limiting the application of § 4:
(1) avoidance of duplicative and potentially ruinous recoveries; (2) reduction of speculative
recoveries; (3) elimination of windfall recoveries; and (4) limiting the burdens placed upon the
federal courts by antitrust suits. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 845-50. Arguments against
according these policy considerations decisive, or even compelling, weight are found in Tyler,
supra note 42, at 286-95. See also infra notes 63, 88, 92 and accompanying text.
49. This direct injury rule was first enunciated in the seminal standing case of Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). The district court in Loeb dismissed a stockholdercreditor's suit alleging that the defendant's illicit use of its monopolistic power bankrupted
the corporation he was associated with, thereby diminishing the value of his stock and making
his claims against the company worthless. In affirming the district court's decision, the Third
Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff did not receive any direct injury from the alleged illegal acts of the
defendant. . . . The injury complained of was directed at the corporation, and
not the individual stockholder. Hence any injury which he, as a stockholder, received
was indirect, remote and inconsequential. . . .There must exist some barrier which
will effectively prevent such a multiplicity of suits as the plaintiff's position suggests . ..
Id. at 709 (emphasis added). Some commentators have suggested that this test could have been
narrowly construed to disallow recovery of damages actually sustained by another, such as
the corporation. Thus, if the corporation brought suit its damage awards would adequately
compensate its shareholders and creditors. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 814-15;
Sherman, supra note 45, at 381-82.
50. The line of demarcation between direct and indirect injury is difficult to establish. Consequently, in applying this test courts have tended to focus on the relationship between the
alleged antitrust violator and the plaintiff. See Beane, supra note 47, at 33. For judicial recognition
of the inherent difficulties of the direct injury test, see In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.) (no hard and fast rule on directness of injury can be formulated), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile Mfg. Assoc., 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
The test has also been described as conclusory in nature because it tends to obscure the
purpose of the antitrust standing requirement, which is to determine whether the claimant,
based on the alleged violation and injury, is protected by § 4 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 127;
see also Sherman, supra note 45, at 380-82 (reviewing cases applying the direct injury test that
failed to provide a clear formulation of the test).
51. The target area test was devised by the Ninth Circuit in Conference of Studio Unions
v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951) (plaintiff "must show that he is within
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theless, the target area test has not been applied in a clear and consistent
manner. 2 Unfortunately, both tests lack an analytical framework"3 and, instead, rely on tort notions of proximate cause in determining the directness
of the injury.1

4

the area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in
the particular industry"). The term target area was coined by the same court in Karseal Corp.
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955). For more recent expressions of the
target area test, see In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 641
F.2d 457, 469 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 988 (1982); Schwimmer v. Sony Corp.
of Am., 637 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1980); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539,
546 (5th Cir. 1980); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d I, 18-19 (2d Cir.
1979); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 688-89 (8th Cir.
1966); Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 934 (1966).
The Seventh Circuit seems to apply the target area test as its standard for determining whether
a plaintiff can maintain a cause of action. See In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d
514, 517, 518 (7th Cir. 1982) (circuit follows the target area test), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1261 (1983). After reviewing the Seventh Circuit's decisions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the Seventh Circuit probably applies the target area test. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile
Mfg. Assoc., 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
In In re Industrial Gas, the Seventh Circuit declared that its decision in Lupia v. Stella D'Oro
Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979), was the court's
leading case applying the target area test. 681 F.2d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 1982). The Lupia court,
however, explicitly refused to adopt either the direct injury or target area approach to antitrust
standing. 586 F.2d at 1163. The Seventh Circuit recognized that the district court had applied
the target area test but concluded that the "plaintiff could not prevail under [either of the
tests]." Id. at 1169. The Lupia court then expanded on why the plaintiff did not fall within
the target area test. Id. For a commentary on the Lupia court's failure to adopt the target
area test, see Rodipis, Antitrust: Criminal Intent in Antitrust Prosecutions, Collateral Estoppel
and § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, and the Relationship of Standing and Injury in Private Antitrust Suits, 56 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 45, 63-65 (1980). This Comment assumes, arguendo, that
the target area test is the approach followed by the Seventh Circuit.
52. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile Mfg. Assoc., 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). Compare Mulvey
v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff must be within area of
the economy affected by the violation), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971) with Calderone Enter.
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971) (plaintiff must
be a target, or within the target area, of the alleged conspiracy). Some cases employing the
target area test embrace the notion of foreseeability. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir. 1964). Yet, other target area decisions reject this
notion. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile Mfg. Assoc., 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); see also Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 830-32 (target area test described as "riddled with inconsistencies"
while "not reduc[ing] the level of contradiction in the law of antitrust").
53. Tyler, supra note 42, at 273.
54. After recognizing that some courts have employed the tort concept of proximate cause
in determining whether a plaintiff can bring suit, Professor Tyler sharply criticizes application
of this concept to antitrust standing by noting:
Although a doctrine comparable to proximate cause may be necessary in antitrust
law, it has no place in the rules for standing. Even in tort law the question of

19831

CONFIGURATIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW

These apparent contraventions of the clear statutory language of section
4 have not been resolved by the Supreme Court." Recently, however, the
Court clarified, to a limited extent, the analysis required under the rubric
of antitrust standing. In Blue Shield v. McCready," the Court stated that
a party seeking to recover under section 4 must satisfy two preliminary requirements. First, the plaintiff must show that a sufficient nexus existed between the alleged violation and the harm it caused." Second, the plaintiff
must show that the alleged injury is of the type Congress sought to
recompense under the antitrust laws. 8 Applying this bifurcated approach,
the McCready Court held that an employee who was denied reimbursement
for clinical psychological expenses under her employer's medical plan,
allegedly because of an illicit conspiracy between the health insurer, Blue
Shield, and the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia, had standing to bring
suit."
2. An Inappropriate Decision
Four days after the McCready Court announced its broad interpretation
of section 4, the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in In re Industrial Gas
Antitrust Litigation.60 Applying the target area test,6 ' the court of appeals
held that the plaintiff, a corporate executive who claimed he was dismissed
proximate cause rarely enters into the determination of a plaintiff's standing to
The additional standing requirements imposed by lower courts are
bring suit ....
unwarranted judicial accretions to the standing requirements imposed by Congress;
they add nothing but uncertainty and inequity to the law.
Id. at 270-71 (footnotes omitted).
Some courts have begun applying a third test, identified as the "zone of interest" approach.
For example, in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975), the court criticized
the direct injury and target area tests as inappropriately requiring a "determination on the
merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the standing of the claimant." Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Rather than placing a demanding burden on the plaintiff during the pleading stage, the Malmud court reasoned that justice would be better served
if the plaintiff were merely required to show that she suffered an injury as a result of the
defendant's alleged illegality. Additionally, the court would determine if "the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be regulated
by the statute." Id. at 1151 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)). For later dictum approving the zone of interest approach, see California
State Council v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 648 F.2d 527, 537-38 & n.18 (9th Cir. 1980).
55. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 467 n.12 (1982) (Court refused to
rule on the viability of any of the "possibly conflicting" tests adopted by the circuits).
56. Id. at 465.
57. Id. at 478.
58. Id.
59. The McCready Court based its liberal grant of standing on a naturally expansive reading
of the words which comprise § 4. Id. at 472-73. This interpretation was consistent with the
Court's prior applications of that section. Id. For an appraisal of this rationale, see infra note
85 and accompanying text.
60. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). McCready was decided
on June 21, 1982. In re Industrial Gas was decided on June 25, 1982.
61. See supra note 51.
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by his employer for refusing to participate in an alleged industry-wide pricefixing conspiracy, lacked standing to sue under the federal antitrust laws.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the alleged conspiracy was "aimed at
restraining competition in the industrial gas market"; it did not seek to limit
competition in the labor market for industrial gas executives. 62 Consequently, the court held that Bichan, the plaintiff, was not within the area affected
by the alleged antitrust violation, and, thus, he could not have suffered an
antitrust injury.6 3
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Industrial Gas, construed two Supreme Court
decisions as mandating the result that Bichan did not suffer an antitrust
injury. First, the court read Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc."
as holding that private actions were designed solely to protect those injured
as consumers or competitors within the area of the economy affected by
the alleged antitrust violation." Because Bichan was an ex-employee, he could
62. 681 F.2d at 517.
63. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit rejected a Ninth Circuit holding
that granted standing to a plaintiff who similarly was denied employment opportunities after
revealing an antitrust violation. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1982). In Ostrofe, the Ninth Circuit balanced the competing policy interests of private antitrust
enforcement. According to the Ninth Circuit, the major reason for granting a plaintiff standing was to effectuate the enforcement purposes of § 4. Weighed against this consideration
was the need to avoid "vexatious litigation and excessive liability." Id. at 1383. The Ostrofe
court concluded that the interests of enforcement clearly predominated all other concerns. The
court recognized that "[alffording discharged employees standing to sue for treble damages
contributes to the enforcement of the antitrust laws by enhancing potential liability for a kind
of conduct each business conspirator must engage in if it is to perform its role in the conspiracy." Id. at 1384. Due to the small number of employees discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal scheme, the concern with vexatious litigation or destructive liability was
minimal. Id. at 1385.
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished its holding in Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc.,
371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967). Nichols involved a suit brought by a sales supervisor of the
defendant's encyclopedia and reference book division. The suit alleged that an industry-wide
"no switching" agreement, forbidding industry members from hiring a competitor's ex-employee
until six months after the employee's discharge, was violative of the antitrust laws. The defendant contended that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because his failure to find comparable
employment was not an injury to his "business or property." Disagreeing, the court stated that
one who has been damaged by loss of employment as a result of violation of the
antitrust laws is "injured in his business or property" and thus entitled to recovery.
• . ; [Tihe interest invaded by a wrongful act resulting in loss of employment is
so closely akin to the interest invaded by impairment of one's business as to be
indistinguishable in this context.
Id. at 334.
The Nichols court concluded that in order to recover under the antitrust laws, a plaintiff
"need not . . . carry on a business in competition with violators of the antitrust laws, and
suffer injury in such business as a result. 'Business . . . denotes the employment or occupation in which a person is engaged to produce a living.' " Id. at 335 (quoting Roseland v.
Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir 1942)). The In re Industrial Gas court classified
the violation in Nichols as "intended to restrict competitive conditions in the labor market."
681 F.2d at 517.
64. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
65. 681 F.2d at 519, Brunswick involved an action brought by competitors of bowling alleys
acquired by Brunswick, a major bowling equipment manufacturer. These competitors claimed
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not be classified as either a consumer or a competitor. Second, the court
interpreted Brunswick in conjunction with the Supreme Court decision in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois66 as implying that section 4 applies "only where
the injury is directly related to the scheme's anticompetitive effect .... -1
According to the Seventh Circuit, Bichan also failed to meet this criterion
since the alleged conspiracy affected only those engaged in the buying and
selling of industrial gas; it did not affect corporate presidents of industrial
gas producers. These Seventh Circuit constructions of precedent conflict with
the Supreme Court ruling in McCready.
Whereas the Seventh Circuit read Brunswick as limiting recovery to
damages caused by direct injuries inflicted on consumers and competitors,
the McCready Court interpreted Brunswick much less restrictively. In
McCready, the Court rejected the claim that only injuries resulting directly
from the alleged conspiracy's anticompetitive effect could be redressed under
Brunswick. Reasoning that McCready sought to recover damages for injuries
inflicted on her as a consequence of the alleged violation, the Court found
Brunswick's requirement of an antitrust injury fulfilled because "the injury
she suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators
sought to inflict on psychologists and the psychotherapy market." 8 Under
this reasoning, Bichan's injury could be similarly redressed because his
dismissal for refusing to participate in the conspiracy was "inextricably inthat Brunswick's entry into the bowling alley operations market would violate § 7 of the Clayton
Act because horizontal retail competition would be lessened. 429 U.S. 477, 482 (1977). The
plaintiffs' theory of injury was that if Brunswick had not taken over the alleys, they would
have acquired the alleys after the alley owners were driven out of business. Thus, the plaintiffs
would have been more successful in their business due to an increased market share. Id. at
481. The Supreme Court concluded that this attenuated theory did not present the type of
injury which the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Id. at 487-88. The Court declared
that antitrust injuries "should reflect the competitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation." Id. at 489.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1978), prohibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Applying § 7, the Court noted that the
plaintiffs' alleged loss of income would occur even if a firm with lesser resources than Brunswick
had acquired the alleys. Thus, any acquisition would have created economic changes. Yet, § 7
only prevents those acquisitions which are likely to produce anticompetitive conditions. Id.
In effect, the acquisitions by Brunswick only deprived the plaintiffs of potential economic gains
from an increased market share; they were not harmed because of any anticompetitive conduct.
66. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
an indirect purchaser, claiming damages as a result of a single overcharge by the antitrust
defendant, was injured under § 4 of the Clayton Act as a result of the pass-on charge. Id.
at 731-32. The Court was concerned with the impracticalities and judicial burdens of applying
a rule that would apportion the impact of an overcharge between direct and indirect purchasers.
Id. at 745-47. As a result, the Court concluded that indirect purchasers were not within the
class of persons that the § 4 remedy was designed to protect. Id. at 735. Significantly, the
Illinois Brick decision failed to articulate any principles to guide courts in making standing
determinations. Id. at 735 n.7. Illinois Brick is not without its critics. See, e.g., Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 828-35, 872-78 (suggesting that the rule against indirect purchasers suing
under § 4 further establishes arbitrary disparities in antitrust standing).
67. 681 F.2d at 519.
68. 457 U.S. at 483 n.19.
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tertwined" with the conspirators' attempts to effectuate their illegal pricefixing scheme. The McCready Court also rejected the claim that section 4
is limited to certain types of plaintiffs by declaring, "The statute does not
confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors,
or to sellers. . . . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-

tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practice by whomever
they may be perpetuated." 69 The Seventh Circuit's decision to erect a complete barrier to recovery by any plaintiff who is neither a consumer nor a
competitor of the defendant is in contradiction with Supreme Court precedent.

Additionally, the Seventh Circuit seemingly failed to recognize the significant distinctions between the facts presented in In re IndustrialGas and those
existing in Brunswick and Illinois Brick. In Brunswick, the plaintiffs' asserted
loss resulted from an increase in competition in the market.7" Yet, increased
competition could not be a defense in In re Industrial Gas because Bichan
alleged that an industry-wide price-fixing conspiracy existed among producers
of industrial gas." If the price-fixing charge were proven, it would be per
se illegal;" accordingly, it would be presumed that competition was not
advanced.7" Therefore, the alleged antitrust violation in Brunswick was
dissimilar to the illegality asserted in In re Industrial Gas. Furthermore, the
reliance on Illinois Brick was misplaced because, unlike the plaintiff in that
case, Bichan was not suing as an indirect purchaser."
A more sublime reason for finding that Bichan's injury could be redressed
under the antitrust laws is that those statutes serve to regulate the conduct
of business performance. 75 This purpose is exemplified by the statutorily imposed criminal sanctions against individuals who are responsible for antitrust violations. 6 By providing criminal sanctions as an available penalty

69. Id. at 472 (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 515 (7th Cir. 1982). Bichan further
alleged that the conspiracy was aimed at allocating customers among the conspirators. Id. This
allegation also constituted a per se illegal claim. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (division of markets is per se illegal).
72. Price fixing is per se illegal under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (maximum price fixing is illegal per se); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (there is no justification for the argument that a fixed price is legal and, therefore, reasonable); United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (because price fixing directly restrains competition, it is per se illegal).
Consequently, the fact that price fixing promotes competition is no defense.
73. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the decision to apply a per se illegality
standard to price-fixing practices conclusively precludes any defense that such practices are
beneficial because price fixing is repugnant to the notion of competition. See, e.g., Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977) (per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive).
74. See supra note 66.
75. See, e.g., W. LETWIN, supra note 14 at 3-4 ("[t]he specific effects of the Act are produced in the first place by citizens who trim their behavior so as to conform to its commands").
76. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
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for antitrust violations, Congress sought to discourage culpable behavior
evidenced by an individual's willingness to violate federal statutes.77 Thus,
if Bichan had participated in the alleged price-fixing conspiracy, the antitrust
laws conceivably could have served as the basis for a criminal prosecution
against him."8 Even if Bichan merely carried out the duties of his employment by participating in the conspiracy, he nonetheless could have been

criminally liable. 79 Therefore, his refusal to participate in the alleged con-

spiracy constituted legal compliance with the mandates of the antitrust
statutes. Because Bichan's honorable conduct resulted in damaging his professional career,8" the injury he suffered should be recognized as falling within
the ambit of section 4 of the Clayton Act.
In addition to the In re Industrial Gas court's inappropriate ruling that

only consumers or competitors directly injured by the alleged violation can
maintain an antitrust cause of action, the Seventh Circuit also held that to

bring suit, the plaintiff must be the "most efficient enforcer" of the antitrust laws. 8 ' The Seventh Circuit deemed this requirement essential because
of the countervailing policies that support the restriction of private treble
damage actions. Although the court recognized that private actions deter
antitrust violations, 82 it concluded that the potential for excessive damage

recoveries justified limiting the right to bring a federal antitrust suit to only
those persons who have suffered "immediate injuries with respect to their
'83
business or property."
Restricting the grant of standing to this select class of efficient enforcers
77. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 414 (1962).
78. In a criminal prosecution for conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws, the defendant's
intent to engage in the illegal conspiracy must be proven. See generally United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440 (1978) ("the same basic concerns which are manifest
in our general requirement of mens rea in criminal statutes . . . are at least equally salient
in the antitrust context"). When a per se violation is found, however, no intent is necessary
for a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979)
(specific intent need not be shown in criminal prosecutions under antitrust laws when offense
is a per se violation); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th
Cir. 1979) (per se rules are substantive rules of law which define illegal conduct).
79. As the Supreme Court adamantly stated:
[A] corporate officer is subject to prosecution under § I of the Sherman Act whenever
he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract, combination, or
conspiracy-be he one who authorizes, orders, or helps perpetrate the crimeregardless of whether he is acting in a representative capacity.
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 415 (1962).
80. Bichan was fired as executive president of Chemetron's industrial market division and
allegedly blacklisted throughout the industry. Consequently, he was unable to find comparable
employment. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 581 F.2d 514, 515 (7th Cir. 1982); see also
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1982) (granting standing to
an employee who was dismissed because he refused to comply with an alleged antitrust
conspiracy).
81. 681 F.2d at 516, 520.
82. Id. at 520. The court also gave lip service to the compensatory objectives of private
antitrust damage awards. Id.
83. Id.
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is repugnant to the express congressional intent of section 4: to vest a cause
of action in "any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."" There is no statutory
requirement that the plaintiff be an efficient enforcer, as measured by the
directness of her injury. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently
asserted that section 4 of the Clayton Act is to be accorded its broad meaning without resort to artificial limitations that effectively deny standing to
deserving plaintiffs." Against this clear judicial mandate for a liberal construction of section 4, the Seventh Circuit's requirement that the plaintiff
must prove she is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws seems unjustifiably

restrictive.
The In re Industrial Gas court's attempt to create a barrier to standing,
which can be overcome only by those who are found to be the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, confuses the legal issue of who may
sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act with the substantive issue of what
constitutes an antitrust violation.8 6 The court's manipulation of the standing
requirement necessitates factual determinations at a preliminary stage of the
litigation before the factual issues have been developed."1 Requiring the plaintiff to prove the substantive issues of a complex antitrust claim, merely to
establish a right to sue, frustrates Congress's intent that anyone injured as

84. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
85. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) ("[c]onsistent with the congressional purpose, we have refused to engraft artificial limitations on the § 4 remedy"); Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (Court gave the term business or property of
§ 4 its "nationally broad and inclusive meaning," which enabled a consumer to bring suit
claiming that she had to pay a higher price for a hearing aid as a result of an illegal conspiracy; it then reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding that only injuries sustained in a commercial
context can be recovered); Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978) (Court interpreted
the words any person of § 4 to be inclusive and allowed a foreign government to bring an
antitrust suit); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 748 (1977) (treble damage action
is provided to deter violations of antitrust statutes); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 262 (1972) ("Congress chose to permit all persons to sue" under § 4); Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968) (Congress did not want to make
the doctrine of in pari delicto a defense to § 4 actions); Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957) (because Congress viewed private enforcement most favorably, "this
Court should not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically
set forth by Congress in those laws").
86. The suggestion that a plaintiff is the proper party to sue because his injury flowed
directly from an antitrust violation implies that the trial court must determine whether the
party is protected by the antitrust statutes. Essentially, without the benefit of a factual record
the trial court must make an inquiry, either objectively or subjectively, into how the substantive laws of antitrust protect the plaintiff. After this is accomplished, the court must then proceed to analyze the plaintiff's efficiency in presenting those claims, possibly by comparing the
plaintiff with hypothetical plaintiffs not before the court. For a severe criticism of the confusion raised by the courts' treatment of standing and the scope of the substantive law, see Berger
& Bernstein, supra note 45, at 835-40 (arguing that such confusion may lead to improper distortions of the substantive law).
87. See Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing
the Chaos, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593, 1603, 1608 (1980).
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a result of an antitrust violation should have a federal cause of action. 8
Even assuming that efficiency in enforcement is a requirement of standing, Bichan arguably served this function by uncovering the illegality before
the social costs inflicted by the price-fixing conspiracy materialized. The pricefixing conspiracy that Bichan sought to detect was necessarily covert.8 9

Encouraging unwilling participants to the scheme, who are privy to the nature
and extent of a conspiracy, to come forward and expose the illegal activity
would further the objective of uncovering anticompetitive practices. Unfortunately, by refusing to grant standing to an employee who was discharged
by his employer for refusing to engage in illegality, the Seventh Circuit
effectively discourages the detection of antitrust conspiracies.9" Competitors

cannot be relied upon for deterrence when the conspiracy is industry wide,
as it was in In re Industrial Gas.9 ' Moreover, allowing a plaintiff in Bichan's
position to bring suit and expose the price-fixing scheme at its inception
could prevent injury to consumers who would be the ultimate victims of
the illegality. Viewed in this light, consumer actions are inefficient because
a conspiracy would be fully developed by the time a consumer could detect
the antitrust violation. Consequently, the court improvidently failed to ac-

cord proper weight to the deterrence function of section 4, which has been
recognized as an overriding objective of private enforcement. 92
88. Although it is not meritless, the Seventh Circuit's concern with excessive treble damage
suits is nonetheless exaggerated. See In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 520
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). The large litigation costs incurred by
a plaintiff necessarily restrict the number of claims filed and pursued. See Wheeler, Antitrust
Treble Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1329-34 (1973). Furthermore, the time commitment involved is considerable. Professor Posner wrote that the average
length of an antitrust proceeding is 44 months. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcON. 365, 381 (1970). Additionally, procedural devices, such as motions
for directed verdict, enable the court to dismiss summarily those claims that are shown to
be meritless. Finally, the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs in antitrust actions lose. One
commentator has noted that only 20% of such plaintiffs receive a favorable judgment. Wheeler,
supra, at 1323-24 n.22.
89. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 847 n.12 (conspiracies in restraint of trade
are inherently covert).
90. The Ninth Circuit succinctly summed up the importance of providing wrongfully discharged employees a federal forum when it stated, "Affording discharged employees standing
to sue for treble damages contributes to the enforcement of the antitrust laws by enhancing
potential liability for a kind of conduct each business conspirator must engage in if it's to
perform its role in the conspiracy." Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th
Cir. 1982).
91. Bichan alleged that the price-fixing and customer allocation scheme was industry wide.
681 F.2d at 515.
92. For Supreme Court recognition that private antitrust actions serve as a major deterrent
to antitrust violations, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 748 (1977); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
Professor Tyler has argued vehemently against subordinating the deterrence function through
application of restrictive standing tests. Tyler, supra note 42, at 277-85. The deterrence function is paramount because public enforcement agencies lack the resources and incentives necessary
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The In re Industrial Gas decision presents a curious approach to antitrust
standing. The broad wording of section 4 of the Clayton Act,93 numerous

Supreme Court decisions mandating a liberal construction of that section,9"
and the strong deterrent objectives of private actions," inescapably lead to
the conclusion that In re IndustrialGas was decided incorrectly.96 Its under-

to assure social deterrence of antitrust violations. Id. at 277-80. Although the compensatory
role of treble damages may be important in providing a plaintiff with financial incentives to
pursue costly and uncertain litigation, this compensatory role may be overstated. Id. at 277;
see also supra note 46.
During its debate on the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Congress reiterated the compensatory and deterrent policies underlying § 4 by declaring, "The antitrust laws clearly reflect
the national policy of encouraging private parties to help enforce the antitrust laws in order
to protect competition through compensation of antitrust victims, through punishment of antitrust violators, and through deterrence of antitrust violations." S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2, 38, 165 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1976).
93. See supra notes 43, 85 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 85.
95. See supra notes 46, 63, 92 and accompanying text.
96. Apparently, however, the Seventh Circuit will continue to follow its decision in In re
Industrial Gas. In Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), the
court cited In re Industrial Gas for the proposition that not everyone who is injured by anticompetitive conduct has standing to sue. Id. at 473. The issue in Grip-Pak was whether the
plaintiff, who had not yet begun business operations, could recover under § 4 for potential
lost profits and costs incurred while defending prior litigation which was instigated to deter
competition. Judge Posner, writing for the majority, found that the plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged antitrust injuries. Id.Interestingly, Judge Posner did not cite McCready, in which the
Supreme Court most recently construed § 4 of the Clayton Act. Rather, Posner relied on several
tort cases that held that the remoteness of a plaintiff's injury is established if it is not foreseeable.
This approach conflicts with the McCready standard for analyzing antitrust injuries. See
supra text accompanying notes 56-58. Foreseeability may be an appropriate means to restrict
tort claims based on negligence. Antitrust violations and their resultant injuries, however, are
imposed intentionally, rather than negligently. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 835. Furthermore, notions of foreseeability are susceptible to inconsistent application leading to contradictory judicial results. See Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28-31 (1971).
If Judge Posner continues to rely on tort principles to determine the existence of an antitrust
injury, he should at least employ the broader scope of liability recognized for intentional torts
rather than the negligence concept of foreseeability. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS

§§ 3, 8 (4th ed. 1971).

Another disturbing feature of Judge Posner's analysis is his application of a socioeconomic
benefits standard to an antitrust provision designed to compensate the individual. He states
that if the losses caused to one party are offset by gains made elsewhere in the economic system,
then the party who suffered the loss cannot recover. Grip-Pak, 647 F.2d at 474. This interpretation of § 4 contravenes its deterrent purpose by precluding private persons from collecting
treble damages for antitrust violations. By focusing on the net economic effect of the harm,
Judge Posner belittles the personal harm that initially triggered an individual or small firm
to bring an expensive antitrust action. By determining the existence of an injury through an
evaluation of the adverse effects upon society, the purpose of private antitrust litigation is
usurped; under such an evaluation, all antitrust actions become public in their nature. The
probable justification for such a procedure is to protect defendants from ruinous duplicative
treble damage awards. These policy concerns, however, are adequately protected by the McCready
test of probable cause. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. For a discussion of techni-
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lying proposition, that allowing private treble damage actions might be
counterproductive because of the potentially excessive number of suits, should

not decide the legal issue of who can maintain a federal antitrust cause of
action. By granting standing only to competitors or consumers who, because

of the directness of their injury, are deemed the most efficient enforcers,
the Seventh Circuit has restricted the scope of section 4. This construction

of the statute serves to reject, at the courthouse door, persons bringing antitrust actions who fail to meet this difficult test. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 4 standing requirements highlights the court's urge to

restrict private antitrust suits. Although the framework for analyzing standing in In re Industrial Gas is consistent with the Chicago school theorists'
position that private treble damage actions should be restricted,97 this standard impermissibly contravenes well-established Supreme Court precedent.
The temporal proximity of McCready and In re Industrial Gas, and their
disparate approaches to antitrust standing analysis, dramatize the irresponsible effort of the Seventh Circuit to restrict private enforcement of the anti-

trust laws.
B. Reversal of Criminal Contempt Order for Failure to Comply with
Discovery Request-Burdening the Plaintiff
In Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons," the Seventh
Circuit reviewed the validity of a criminal contempt citation issued against
the defendant after it refused to comply with a protective discovery order. 99
ques available to satisfy these policy concerns without denying standing, see Berger & Bernstein, supra note 45, at 862-64 (alternatives include apportioning damages at trial, applying procedural techniques such as impleader to bring all relevant parties before the court in one suit,
or possibly determining standing after evidence of overkill is admitted).
The United States Supreme Court denied Bichan's petition for writ of certiorari. Bichan v.
Chemetron Corp., cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). Justice Blackman would have granted
certiorari, vacated the Seventh Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for consideration in
light of the Court's decision in Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). The Court also vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ostrofe in light of Associated General Contractors. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). Justice Stevens's opinion in Associated
General Contractors is a convoluted analysis of antitrust standing that offers vague references
to factors that a court should consider in its analysis of a private plaintiff's antitrust standing.
Accordingly, it simply adds to the general confusion that exists in the area of antitrust standing.
97. See, e.g., Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust
Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1980) (cited approvingly by the court in In re Industrial Gas,
681 F.2d 514, 515 n.1 (7th Cir. 1982)). Professor Page argues for a restrictive application of
§ 4 in accordance with the criteria of economic efficiency.
98. 692 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir. 1982).
99. Id. at 1087. After the Academy, defendant, refused on the grounds of confidentiality
to comply with the plaintiffs' discovery request, the district court issued a protective order
limiting access to the documents to the plaintiffs and their counsel. Id. The discovery order
was issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which empowers the court "to
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Yet, the
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That order required the Academy to furnish the plaintiff-surgeons with
documents relating both to the denial of their application for membership
and to the denial of all other applicants between 1970 and 1980.100 This
information allegedly was essential to the plaintiffs' claim that their denial
of membership was the result of a group boycott prohibited under section
1 of the Sherman Act.' 0'

The Marrese court ruled'02 that the contempt citation was improper. Writing
for the majority, Judge Posner stated that in considering the interests of
both parties,'03 the court must find the least burdensome method of discovery.
Judge Posner reasoned that the underlying merits of the plaintiffs' antitrust

claims should be evaluated to determine the requested information's "value"
to the party seeking discovery.'10 Determining that the substantive antitrust

claims were probably groundless, Judge Posner ruled that the district court
should have postponed discovery of the documents until after discovery was

Academy refused to comply with the protective order. Consequently, pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(d),
which provides for sanctions against parties who refuse to comply with discovery requests,
the court fined the Academy $10,000 for its contempt. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(d). For an
example of the use of criminal contempt to compel discovery, see Southern Ry. v. Lanham,
403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968).
100. 692 F.2d at 1087. Although they satisfied the membership requirements, the plaintiffs
were denied membership without a hearing and without cause. Id. at 1086. The plaintiffs claimed
direct damage to their professional status as surgeons due to the Academy's alleged illegal boycott
under § I of the Sherman Act. The Academy was characterized as "a monopoly in its field,
possessed of substantial power to control the market for orthopaedic services, especially by
denying access to any of the various subspecialty organizations of the practice." Plaintiffs'
Complaint at App. A, Marrese v. Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 496 F. Supp. 236, 242
(N.D. I11. 1980).
101. See infra note 109-10.
102. Judge Posner, substituting for the late Judge Sprecher, and Judge Pell were in the
majority. Judge Posner wrote the majority opinion, from which retired Supreme Court Justice
Stewart forcefully dissented.
103. Judge Posner cites the Academy's interest in preserving the confidentiality of its application process. Although not of constitutional magnitude, this interest nonetheless implicates
some first amendment concerns. 692 F.2d at 1088. Judge Posner does not explicitly state any
interest on the part of the plaintiffs in the information, although it can be gleaned from the
nature of the case that such information was necessary to establish their cause of action. See
infra notes 109-10.
104. 692 F.2d at 1089. It appears that Judge Posner obliquely determined that the cost to
the Academy of complying with the disputed discovery request was not justifiable, and that
the solicitation of such discovery was largely a predatory tactic by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
In 1973, Judge Posner theorized that litigants can inflict severe financial damage upon the
opposing party by demanding the production of costly information. He explained:
Pretrial discovery provides a somewhat different example of the possibility of
predatory conduct in litigation. In principle, a litigant could impose heavy costs
on an opponent, at little cost to himself, by demanding information in an amount
and form very costly for the other party to supply.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 433 (1973). In that article, however, Judge Posner concluded that such predatory
pretrial conduct was "rare." Id.
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concluded on the issue of probable anticompetitive effect.'", According to
Judge Posner, by utilizing this procedure the district court might have been
able to dispose of the entire case, thereby rendering the requested discovery
unnecessary.' 6
The Seventh Circuit's application of this rationale to justify its review of
the merits of the underlying antitrust claims constitutes an objectionable
departure from the proper standard of appellate review of contempt rulings
issued to compel discovery. It is within the broad discretion of the district
court to impose sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order.' 7
Furthermore, appellate court reversal of an order requiring a party to comply with a discovery request is appropriate only if there is a clear showing
of abuse of discretion by the district court."'3 In Marrese, district court Judge
105. 692 F.2d at 1095. Judge Posner ruled that under Rule 26(d), the district court should
have allowed discovery on the issue of anticompetitive effect before discovery occurred on the
Academy's denials of membership. This ruling can be criticized for circumventing the intent
of Rule 26(d). See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
106. 692 F.2d at 1095. The Seventh Circuit stated, "It should have been apparent to the
district court, as it is to us, that the present case is likely to wash out over the issue of effect
on competition." Id. Judge Posner's opinion asserted that to recover on their antitrust claim,
the plaintiffs must prove that an anticompetitive market effect resulted from their exclusion
from the Academy. Id. at 1094. According to Judge Posner, anticompetitive effect could not
have resulted from the plaintiffs' exclusion from the Academy because competition "is designed for the ultimate benefit of consumers rather than individual competitors." Id. at 1095.
Due to the large number of orthopaedic surgeons available to the consuming public, the harm
inflicted on the plaintiffs could have no appreciable effect on competitive conditions. This analysis
of competition, which is reflected in several of Judge Posner's opinions, is critiqued infra notes
212-43 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 27, 555 F.2d 146,
150 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[t]he merits of the underlying [concept order] . . . cannot be challenged
in the appeal from the contempt sentence for violations of that order") (citing Howat v. Kansas,
258 U.S. 181, 189 (1922)).
108. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxitis, 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982)
("[tihe question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would
as an original matter have [applied the sanction]; it is whether the District Court abused its
discretion in so doing") (quoting National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427
U.S. 639, 642 (1976)); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964) (deposition discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately
informing the litigants); Hintman v. National-Ben Franklin Life Ins. Corp., 677 F.2d 617, 620
(7th Cir.. 1982) (imposing discovery sanction is within the responsibility of the district court
and will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion); Belcher v. Bassett Furniture, Inc., 588
F.2d 904, 907 (4th Cir. 1978) (district court's motion for discovery reversed only if the action
was "improvident and affected substantial rights") (quoting Tiedman v. American Pigment
Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958)); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581
(4th Cir. 1977) (district court's order under Rule 26(c) is reversible only upon showing of abuse
of discretion); General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1972)
(sanctions under Rule 37 are available to district court at its discretion and will be reversed
only on a showing of abuse of that discretionary power); Montecatini Edison S.P.A. v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 43 F.2d 70, 72 (3d Cir. 1970) (review of discovery matters is
confined to determining whether district court abused its discretion); see also Developments
in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940, 991 (1961) (nearly all discovery sanction cases
allude to the discretionary power of the district court).
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Shadur carefully assessed the needs and interests of both parties before issuing
his restricted protective discovery order. °9 That order was designed both to
protect the confidentiality of the Academy's admissions procedures'" and
to provide the plaintiffs with information necessary to pursue their action.'
Consequently, by ensuring that all evidence relevant to the alleged antitrust
violation would be uncovered," 2 the order assured the just adjudication of
the controversy.'
The Marrese court did not hold that the district court abused its discretionary powers in assessing the parties' interests in the discovery request.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit ruled that discovery on the issue of anticompetitive effect should have been conducted prior to discovery of the
Academy's denials of membership application. This ruling was improper for
two reasons. First, it was based on a misconception of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(d).' 4 Judge Posner determined that Rule 26(d) vested the district
109. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 80 C 1405, slip op.
at 5-7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1981). The district court noted that
[wlithout access to the documents Drs. Marrese and Treister are effectively prevented
from continuing this litigation. . . . Just disposition of plaintiffs' claims . . would
be rendered impossible should they be denied access to the requested information.
Proof of the claimed group boycott would require demonstration of the real reasons
for Academy's denial of admission to candidates, information obtainable solely
through the materials Academy seeks to protect.
Id. at 6 (quoted in Marrese, 692 F.2d at 1097 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). The restrictions on
access imposed by the protective order insured that "the confidentiality of the Academy's
admission process was largely preserved." Id. at 5.
110. As Justice Stewart's opinion noted, the district court's discovery order was consistent
with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 644 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir.
1981) (per curiam). Marrese, 692 F.2d 1083 at 1097-98 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In Memorial
Hospital, Judge Shadur ordered the defendant hospital in an antitrust action to disclose its
documents pertaining to all proceedings involving applications for admittance on the hospital
staff. 644 F.2d at 1060. After Judge Shadur issued a protective order compelling disclosure,
the hospital sought a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, an order vacating the district
court's order. The hospital asserted that such information was privileged and confidential. Id.
at 1060-61. The court denied the petition for mandamus, stating that the plaintiff's need for
the information to substantiate his antitrust allegation overrode any claim of privilege by the
hospital. "The public interest in private enforcement of federal antitrust law in this context
is simply too strong to permit the exclusion of relevant and possibly crucial evidence by application
of the Hospital's privilege." Id. at 1063.
111. See supra note 109.
112. The Supreme Court has recognized that a major purpose of discovery is to equalize
the parties' knowledge of the facts underlying the controversy. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
113. See generally Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (purposes of discovery are to narrow the issues for trial, to obtain evidence for use at trial, and
to obtain information that will lead to relevant evidence).
114. Rule 26(d) provides:
Sequence and Timing of Discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise,
methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party is
conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay
any other party's discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
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court with the authority to establish the sequence in which issues will be
investigated during discovery.'' 5 Yet, Rule 26(d) was designed only to
eliminate the priority rule'16 which allowed the party who first served notice
of discovery requests to complete discovery pursuant to those requests before
her opponent could obtain discovery.'' Thus, Rule 26(d) rests on the principle that "one party's initiation of discovery should not await upon the
other's completion .... ",8
Second, by reviewing the merits of the antitrust claim, the Seventh Circuit disregarded the district court's denial of the Academy's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under the Sherman Act.'' 9 In that denial, the
district court explicitly found that an anticompetitive effect was sufficiently
alleged in the complaint.' 20 Because the district court did not certify this
holding,' 2 ' the appellate court lacked the authority to review the underlying
merits of the plaintiffs' claim.' 22
The Seventh Circuit's decision to overturn the contempt citation was
premised on the notion that no anticompetitive effect could be shown.' 23
This reasoning was based solely on inferences drawn from the complaint;' 24
115. 692 F.2d at 1095.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) advisory committee note.
117. One court declared that "[t]he rule of 'first come first served' [i.e., the priority rule]
has converted what was intended as an orderly process for the preparation for trial into a
game of strategy and a jockeying for position." Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill
Publishing Co., 11 F.R.D. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). For a development of the priority
rule and its
abolition by Rule 26(d), see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 2045-2047 (1970). For criticisms of the priority rule, see Younger, Priority of
Pretrial Examination in the Federal Courts-A Comment, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271 (1959);
Comment, Discovery Priority Rule Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Friend or Foe?,
74 DICK. L. REV. 103 (1969).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) advisory committee note. The use of the word sequence in Rule
26(d) was "intended only to make it clear that defendant is not to be given any inherent
preference. . . ." Id. Prior to 1970, the year Rule 26(d) was enacted, a plaintiff was required
to wait 20 days after filing his complaint before serving notice of discovery requests. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1969). As a result, applying the priority rule ensured that the defendant would

be given an advantage during the discovery stage. 8 C.
TICE AND PRODEDURE § 2045, at 313-14 (1970).
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119. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 496 F. Supp. 236 (N.D.
11. 1980).
120. Id. at 240-41.
121. Certification allows a party to appeal from a district court's order when the order "involves a controlling question of law to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and ... an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). See generally Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 351, 379 (1969) (reviewing the purpose of interlocutory relief).
122. Marrese, 692 F.2d at 1099 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart described the decision to review the merits of the antitrust claim as a "novel analysis of the validity of the
contempt citation," which "disregards long-settled principles of civil procedure [by allowing
the Academy] to secure immediate, appellate review of the merits of a lawsuit, prior to any
discovery, trial, or judgment, simply by disobeying a discovery order and subjecting [itself]
to the fine imposed for violating the order." Id. at 1098 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
124. 692 F.2d at 1100 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
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it lacked any factual support because it was deduced in the complete absence
of any lower court record."'2 Speculation of this kind should not be employed
to reverse a district court's sensitive application of its discretionary powers
in ordering discovery.
C. Improper Application of Appellate Review
Standards-Preliminary Injunctions
Section 16 of the Clayton Act allows a plaintiff in an antitrust action
to request preliminary injunctive relief.' 26 Although the standard for reviewing the disposition of a preliminary injunction motion varies among the
circuits,' 27 the Seventh Circuit has established a standard that identifies the
following four factors that must be balanced equally in order to determine
the propriety of preliminary relief: (1) the plaintiff's likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if preliminary
relief is denied; (3) the potential harm to the defendant if preliminary relief
is granted; and (4) the public interest implicated by the decision. 2 When
the disposition of a motion for a preliminary injunction is appealed, the
125. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
126. This section provides for preliminary injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under the same conditions and principles
as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
the courts of equity." 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose
of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the relative' positions of the parties until a trial
on the merits can be held. University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1980). For
a list of cases that support the proposition that preliminary injunctions are issued solely to

preserve the status quo of the parties, see cases cited in 2 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 463 n.81 (1973). One commentator has criticized the
emphasis placed on maintaining the status quo as "a habit without a reason." Leubsdorf,
The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 546 (1978).
127. See Note, Granting Preliminary Injunctions Against Dealership Terminations in Antitrust Actions, 67 VA. L. REV. 1395, 1395-98 (1981) (arguing that a definitive standard is necessary
in order to preserve the rights of antitrust defendants).
128. For examples of cases applying the quadrifid test, see Dos Santos v. Columbus-CuneoCabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1982) (district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction in an antitrust action overturned); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) (district court's denial of preliminary injunction reversed
because district judge only considered one factor-the likelihood of success on the merits);
Machlett Laboratories v. Techny Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 795, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1981) (district
court's grant of preliminary injunction in an allegedly unlawful contract dispute was reversed
because the plaintiff failed to prove three of the four factors); Menominee Rubber Co. v.
Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction that prohibited defendant from terminating plaintiff as its distributor notwithstanding
the fact that the defendant might ultimately have prevailed on the merits); Reinders Bros.,
Inc. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 48-49 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming district court's
grant of preliminary injunction that enjoined defendant from discontinuing plaintiff as a dealer
under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law); Fox Valley Harvestore v. A.O. Smith Harvestore
Prod., Inc., 545 F.2d 1096, 1097 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction
in dealer termination case); Burns v. Paddock, 503 F.2d 18, 28 (7th Cir. 1974) (buyers of
minority interest in close corporation properly denied preliminary injunctive relief in their claim
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appellate court's inquiry is limited to whether the district court abused its
discretion in applying this quadrifid standard.' 2 9
In Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 30 the plaintiff in an
antitrust suit requested preliminary injunctive relief. For over thirty-five years,
the plaintiff, Valley, had served as a wholesale distributor of alcoholic
beverages supplied by the defendant, Renfield.' 3 ' This harmonious relationship ended when Renfield abruptly notified Valley that it was discontinuing
Valley's distributorship in the northern counties of Illinois.' 3 2 After being
notified of the termination, Valley filed a complaint in federal district court
alleging that the termination was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. "33
' Valley sought to temporarily enjoin Renfield from cancelling the
distributorship.' 3 4 Stating that Valley had insufficiently demonstrated a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its antitrust claim, the district court
denied the preliminary injunction."'3 The Seventh Circuit affirmed this denial
after considering only one of the four factors necessary to the quadrifid
of fraud against directors of corporation); Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363, 367
(7th Cir. 1971) (reversing district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an antitrust action
brought by terminated franchisees).
The First, Third, and Fourth Circuits also have adopted the four-factor criteria as the standard to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1, 2 (lst Cir. 1982) (district court improperly enjoined Puerto Rican officials from filling a vacancy in their legislature); Constructors Ass'n
v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Delaware River Port Auth. v. Transamerican
Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 920 (3d Cir. 1974)) (district court did riot abuse its discretion in declining to issue preliminary injunction in an action brought by a contractors' association seeking relief from federal statutes that required 10% of all federally funded projects to
be performed by minority businesses); Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d
189, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1977) (district court erred in holding that plaintiff must show likelihood
of success before preliminary injunction will be granted in a dealer termination case brought
under the antitrust laws).
129. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975) ("standard of appellate review is simply whether the issuance of the injunction, in light of the applicable standard, constituted an abuse of discretion"); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)
(decision to grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief is one of judicial discretion); United
States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1935) (appellate review of preliminary injunction is
limited to the question of whether the lower court abused its discretion); Machlett Laboratories
v. Techny Indus., 665 F.2d 795, 797 (7th Cir. 1981) (district judge abused his discretion ordering a preliminary injunction because he failed to apply the proper standard of review).
130. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982).
131. Brief for Appellant at 3, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d
742 (7th Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 8. Renfield's representative notified Valley on October 22, 1981, that Valley's
distributorship would be terminated effective November 1, 1981.
133. Brief for Appellee at 6, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d
742 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Valley's claims under § I of the Sherman Act, see
infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. That section forbids conspiracies, contracts, or other
agreements in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
134. 678 F.2d at 742.
135. Id. at 743. District Judge Grady also ruled that Valley failed to prove that it would
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not issued. Brief for Appellee at 5, Valley Liqubrs,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982).
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test. Writing for the court, Judge Posner declared that if the district court
correctly assumed that Valley would not prevail on the merits at trial, then
the denial was proper "regardless of other considerations."' 36 Judge Posner
then engaged in a lengthy discussion of the merits of Valley's antitrust claims
and concluded that Valley had failed to substantiate them. 37
The Seventh Circuit's reliance solely upon the likelihood of success on
the merits in Valley Liquors is oppugnant to the court's holding in Atari,
Inc. v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp.38 In Atari,
the appellate court reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction in a
copyright infringement suit 39 and reprimanded the lower court for considering
only one of the four factors of the established standard: the threshold requirement of likelihood of success on the merits. "' Like the district court
in Atari, the Seventh Circuit in Valley Liquors failed to consider the remaining factors when it affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction.
Furthermore, the court of appeals did not acknowledge its previous decision
in Atari; nor did it indicate whether it was abandoning its traditional fourfactor analysis."'
If Valley Liquors stands for the proposition that the likelihood of success
on the merits of substantive antitrust claims determines whether a preliminary
injunction will be granted, then it presents the plaintiff and the court with
a nearly insurmountable task. Because preliminary injunction motions arise
before the parties have commenced extensive discovery,' 2 the evidence
136. 678 F.2d at 743. The opinion does not expressly state the other considerations; presumably,
the three other factors of the quadrifid test are the "other considerations."
137. Id. at 743-45. For an analysis of Judge Posner's review of the antitrust claims presented
in Valley Liquors, see infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
138. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
139. Id.at 613-14.
140. Id. at 614. After reversing the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that it could grant preliminary injunctive relief if it found "from
the record that plaintiffs as a matter of law made the requisite showing as to the remaining
elements" in the standard. Id. The court of appeals held that the plaintiff had made the requisite showing as to the remaining factors. Id. at 614-20. The Seventh Circuit then proceeded
to analyze the merits of the copyright infringement claim after noting that "the determination
is predicated upon an ocular comparison of the works themselves and does not involve
any material credibility issues." Id. at 614. Thus, the court of appeals was in as good a position as the district judge to review the merits of the substantive claim. Holding that the "plaintiffs clearly showed likelihood of success," id. at 619, the Valley Liquors court found the district
judge's estimation of the merits to be erroneous. Id. at 620.
In Valley Liquors, Judge Posner evaluated the merits of the plaintiff's claim without making
the determination of whether the court was in the proper position to do so. In fact, he should
never have made this determination because antitrust claims involve definite questions of "material
credibility" which cannot be evaluated by mere "ocular comparisons."
141. For cases applying the four-factor test, see supra note 128.
142. See University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394-95 (1981). "[A] preliminary
injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence
that is less complete than in a trial on the merits." Id. at 395. In Camenisch, a unanimous
Court held that when the injunctive aspects of a case become moot on appeal from a preliminary
injunction, any issue generally preserved by an injunction bond cannot be resolved on appeal,
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necessary to establish the legal issues is inadequate; in complex antitrust proceedings, only limited information is available at this point in the litigation." 3
Consequently, Valley Liquors requires the trial court to determine the merits
of antitrust claims on the basis of a rudimentary hearing in which "the facts
are not clear enough to crystallize [the] question of law.""' Recognizing
the impropriety of this result, appellate courts, including the Seventh Circuit, often have eased the preliminary injunction requirement of showing
a likelihood of success on the merits in antitrust actions." 5 Moreover, the
balancing approach reduces the necessity of fulfilling this requirement, because
it directs the court not to accord any single factor dispositive weight." 6 By
considering only Valley's chance of prevailing on the merits at full trial,
however, Judge Posner's opinion undermines the purpose of the balancing
approach.
Although it is unclear, it does not appear that the Valley Liquors court
intended to abandon the four-factor standard completely because the court
neither distinguished precedent embracing the balancing approach, nor
articulated an alternative standard for measuring the propriety of preliminary
injunctive relief. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has reiterated its commitment to the quadrifid test in a decision rendered subsequent to Valley
Liquors."7 Thus, the conclusion gleaned from the Valley Liquors treatment
but instead must be resolved at trial on the merits. The Court relied heavily on the fact that
the "likelihood of success" on the merits does not require the plaintiff to prove his case in
full. Id.
In Valley Liquors, the district court heard testimony on two separate days before denying
the preliminary injunction. Brief for Appellant at 5, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers,
Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982). It is difficult to imagine that a complete factual record
of the issues was developed within these two days.
143. For a review of the complicated antitrust standards involved in Valley Liquors, see infra
notes 158-60, 166-74 and accompanying text.
144. Leubsdorf, supra note 126, at 557.
145. See, e.g., Menominee Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1981)
("some courts have gone so far as to hold that [in antitrust cases] plaintiffs need not even
establish the likelihood"); Jacobson & Co. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 548 F.2d 438, 441-43 (2d
Cir. 1977) (no more than a showing of sufficiently serious questions on the merits need be
made; trial court need not find likelihood of success on the merits); Milsen Co. v. Southland
Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) (in dealer termination cases brought on antitrust grounds,
lesser showing of probability of success is required).
146. See Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1978) ("while these factors
structure the inquiry ....
no one aspect will necessarily determine its outcome"). Practically
speaking, however, if there is "no probability of success on the merits, and no irreparable
injury, it is unnecessary for the court to consider the other factors." Kolz %v.Board of Educ.,
576 F.2d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); see, e.g., Machlett Laboratories v. Techny
Indus., 665 F.2d 795, 797 (7th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff failed to prove three of the four factors);
Menominee Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1981) (reversal is appropriate
only when a "showing from the totality of factors" indicates that the trial court abused its
discretion); Reinders Bros., Inc. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 49 (7th Cir. 1980)
("no one of these factors is decisive").
147. See Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1349 (7th
Cir. 1982). In that case, an anesthesiologist brought an antitrust suit against the defendanthospital for allegedly illegal exclusive contract provisions that fixed the fee schedule of the
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of preliminary injunctive relief is that under the influence of Judge Posner,
the court determined that Valley's antitrust claims were without legal
significance. This conclusion is based on the appellate court's extensive
analysis and refutation of the plaintiff's theories supporting its antitrust
claims.' Although the discussion of these antitrust theories is purely
advisory,'" 9 the implications generated from the court's critique will have
significant repercussions for plaintiffs who bring actions alleging that their
suppliers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
D. Nonprice Vertical Market Restraints
1. Background
Valley's termination as a Renfield distributor exemplifies a nonprice vertical restraint because it restricted the manner in which Valley could resell
plaintiff's services. The district court enjoined enforcement of the contract, ordered the hospital
to "abolish and dismantle all vestiges" of the exclusive contract, and demanded each member
of the department of anesthesiology to compete for service positions. Id. at 1348. After reviewing each of the four factors, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the preliminary order was
far too broad and constituted an abuse of the district court's discretionary powers. Id. at 1351.
But cf. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982).
Omega involved an appeal from a denial of preliminary relief in an antitrust action. The plaintiff sought to temporarily enjoin the City of Indianapolis from enforcing an ordinance that
prescribed grants of cable television franchises. Id. at 120-21. The plaintiff claimed that the
ordinance was being used by the city to exclude competition in the cable television market
in violation of §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id.
Judge Posner, again writing for the majority, affirmed the district court's ruling. He declared
that in ruling on a preliminary injunction request, a court must compare the probabilities and
consequences of two potential errors: the error in "granting an injunction to an undeserving
plaintiff," and the error in "denying an injunction to a deserving plaintiff." Id. at 123. Judge
Posner distinguished between the two plaintiffs by defining a deserving plaintiff as one who
will ultimately prevail at trial. Id.
Once again, Judge Posner completely ignored prior Seventh Circuit decisions that applied
the quadrifid standard. Also, he never alluded to his opinion in Valley Liquors. While in Valley
Liquors he found the factor of likelihood of success on the merits to be dispositive, in Omega
the lack of injury to the plaintiff was determined to be conclusive. Id. at 124-25. Although
Judge Posner attempted to formulate a standard for preliminary injunctions in Omega, the
inconsistencies between his decisions in that case and Valley Liquors make it extremely difficult
to identify what standard, if any, is being applied.
148. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g.. University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1982) (when injunctive
aspects of a case become moot on appeal of preliminary relief, remaining issues must be resolved
by the trial court); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 451 (1973) (Court refused to review constitutionality of statutory filing fee for candidates in congressional elections because the ultimate
merits of appellee's claim were not an issue before a court considering the validity of a preliminary
injunction); Machlett Laboratories v. Techny Indus., 665 F.2d 795, 797 (7th 'Cir. 1981)
(preliminary injunction determinations do not bind the trial court on the merits); Menominee
Rubber Co. v. Gould, Inc., 657 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); Reinders Bros., Inc.
v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1980) (preliminary injunction does not
involve a final determination of the merits of plaintiff's claim); Industrial Bank v. Tobriner,
405 F.2d 1321, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (same); Hunter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.,
188 F.2d 294, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1951) (same).
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Renfield's products. Nonprice vertical market restraints are conditions imposed by a manufacturer or supplier on its distributors; these conditions
limit the distributors' freedom to redistribute goods." ' Such restraints are
motivated by a manufacturer's desire to gain control over the distribution
of its products without having to generate its own distribution systemwhich integration requires.' 5 ' By imposing these nonprice restraints. a
manufacturer-supplier is provided with an effective method of establishing
and maintaining a secure system of distribution.' 52 Yet, the benefits derived
by the manufacturer necessarily entail limiting the restrained firm's freedom

150. Generally, there are three categories of nonprice vertical market restraints. Territorial
restraints identify the geographic regions in which goods may be resold. Customer restraints
limit those customers, or classes of customers, to whom the goods may be sold. Location clauses
prohibit dealers from opening other outlets without the prior approval of the manufacturer.
For an analysis of these three types of restraints, see Strasser, Vertical Territorial Restraints
After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J. 775, 785-94; Note,
Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795, 796 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution]. There are a host of other ways
a manufacturer-supplier can influence competitive conditions through vertical restraints. For
example, the manufacturer-supplier may employ primary responsibility clauses which require
dealers to concentrate sales efforts in a particular locality. See Note, Area of Primary Responsibility Clauses and the Antitrust Laws, 35 U. PIn. L. REV. 671 (1974). The manufacturersupplier also may utilize profit pass-over clauses which require dealers to reimburse each other
for sales made in another's particular territory. See Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution,
supra, at 814. Finally, the manufacturer-supplier may rely on exclusive dealership arrangements
which "denote a promise by the seller of goods to the buyer not to sell to other outlets within
the buyer's 'exclusive territory' and not to seW ttrectly to consumers within that area." Id.;
see also Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument
for the Continuing Use of a Partial Per SeApprah, 75 MicH. L. REV. 275, 277-79 (1976);
Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 CoLuM.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1978).
Since 1911, vertical price fixing has been held to be per se illegal. Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 406-07 (1911). This type of price fixing has consistently been held to violate § 1;moreover, the scope of vertical price fixing has been expanded
to include maximum resale price maintenance agreements. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 153-54 (1968).
151. Integration is the process whereby a firm involved in one level of business subsumes
another level's functions. For example, forward integration occurs when a firm at the manufacturing level assumes the distribution process of its product. For a succinct definition of integration, see Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27, 27 (1949). The
determination of whether to integrate entails consideration of the acquisition and operating
costs involved, the benefits perceived, and whether the firm has, or can acquire, the expertise
necessary to operate effectively at the integrated level. 'For a discussion of the implications
of integration, see Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in 4 ECONOMCA 386 (1937); Williamson,
The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. EcoN. REV.
112 (1971). For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of substituting vertical restraints
for integration, see Kellman, Vertical Territorial Restrictions and the Limits of Planning, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 1107 (1978).
152. Most manufacturers reach ultimate buyers through intermediaries. Although there are
several layers of intermediaries in many industries, the, analysis of vertical market restraints
in this Comment will assume a simplified two-tier disrribution system: a manufacturer sells
to a dealer or distributor who, in turn, sells to the ultimate purchaser.
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to make business decisions." 3 Sometimes this result is beneficial because both
parties achieve independent business objectives. For example, the distributor
may gain an exclusive territory or a reduction in the number of competitors
of similar products, while the manufacturer receives assurances that the
distributor will provide promotional and service-oriented activities. In other
situations, however, the restraints may be overly oppressive if they are used
to compel certain actions that are beneficial to the manufacturer-supplier,
but are only of marginal utility or disadvantageous to the distributor.
The Supreme Court's vacillation over nonprice vertical market restraints
reflects the controversy surrounding their legality.' 54 In 1963, the Court
refused to apply a per se illegality standard to such restraints; the Court
5
reasoned that it lacked sufficient justification for applying a per se standard.1 5
Four years later, however, the Court apparently found sufficient justification because it held that nonprice vertical market restraints are per se illegal
when they are imposed by a supplier who has parted with dominion over
the restrained goods.5 6 Nevertheless, a decade later, in Continental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 57 the Supreme Court abandoned its per se approach and opted to analyze nonprice vertical restraints under the "rule of
reason."1 8
153. Kellman, supra note 151, at 1109.
154. Some commentators argue that vertical restraints that completely confine the distributor's
freedom are economically inferior to less restrictive methods. Louis, supra note 150; see also
Pitofsky, supra note 150 (arguing that the per se illegality standard should apply to airtight
customer and territorial restrictions). Other commentators, such as Posner, argue that both
price and nonprice vertical restrictions promote competition and, therefore, should be presumptively legal. Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 1; Posner, Antitrust Policy and
the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 283-99. Still other commentators argue that only in limited
circumstances will vertical restrictions reduce competition. See, e.g., Meecham & Lamer, A
Proposed Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints on Competition, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 195
(1981) (vertical restraints are undesirable when they are used as part of a price-fixing scheme
or to foreclose entry into the market); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (1979) (vertical
restraints can be used to create interdependence when a homogeneous product is involved).
155. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (reversing a summary judgment that held territorial and customer restraints illegal per se, because the judicial experience
necessary to apply per se rule to nonprice vertical restraints was lacking).
156. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 279-80 (1967) (vertical territorial restrictions held per se illegal; rule of reason standard applicable if dealers acted as
agents or consignees of the manufacturer-supplier). For an analysis of the rule of reason, see
infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. In Arnold, Professor Posner argued before the
Supreme Court on behalf of the government. He later stated his embarrassment for the positions he had advocated and made a "180' turn" with respect to his views of restricted distribution. Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 2. For examples of articles critical
of Schwinn's per se illegality standard, see Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting
Intra-Brand Competition, A.B.A. ANrITRUST SEC. at 9-10 n.24 (1977). For examples of lower
court opinions avoiding the per se illegality rule by distinguishing Schwinn, see id at 13-25;
see also Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 270-81 (1975)
(review of post-Schwinn pronouncements).
157. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
158. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. The Sylvania Court addressed the legality
of a location clause that restricted the plaintiff from selling the defendant's television sets in
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As its name suggests, the rule of reason requires the fact finder, consider-

ing all of the circumstances of the particular case, to determine whether the
restrictive practice unreasonably restrains competition.' 9 The Sylvania Court,
however, failed to provide concrete guidelines for applying the rule of reason
to nonprice vertical restraints.' 60 Rather, the Court endorsed a case-by-case
certain retail outlets. Continental TV was terminated as a dealer after it willfully violated the
location restraint. The Court held that although intrabrand competition (competition among
distributors of the same manufacturer) was reduced, interbrand competition (competition among
sellers of the same generic product) may have been enhanced. 443 U.S. at 54-55. Given the
possible efficiencies and procompetitive interbrand effects of some nonprice vertical restrictions, the Court overruled Schwinn's per se illegality rule. The Court reviewed the per se illegality
test articulated in North Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), which declared
that per se rules are "appropriate only when they relate to competition that is manifestly anticompetitive," and it found that the location clause in Sylvania did not meet these demanding
standards. The Court noted that any "departure from the rule of reason standard must be
based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line
drawing." 443 U.S. at 58-59. On this note, the Court overruled the Schwinn per se standard. Id.
159. In 1918, Justice Brandeis provided the classic statement of the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the :restraint and
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). By adopting this standard,
the Sylvania Court required that a variety of factors be assessed by the fact finder in determining whether particular practices were unreasonable. 433 U.S. at 49-50 n.15. Interestingly, Justice
Brandeis's formulation of the rule of reason did not consider the parties' market power. Due
to the requirement that a variety of factors must be considered under the rule of reason, protracted and complex litigation often occurs. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 150, at 277-78 (a per
se approach to certain restraints should be maintained because the rule of reason analysis generates
substantial administrative burdens).
Criticism of the rule of reason is prevalent among commentators. See, e.g., McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices and Refusals to Deal,
37 ANTITRUST L.J. 137, 144 (1967) (bulky and protracted proceedings are required under the
rule of reason); Pitofksy, supra note 150, at 2 (the rule's vagueness renders it ineffective for
judicial analysis and offers little in the way of a deterrent effect).
160. 443 U.S. at 49 ("the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case"). Ten months
after Sylvania, the Supreme Court clarified the rule of reason in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The Court held that the Society's canon
of professional ethics, which prohibited the submission of competitive bids by its members,
was unlawful. Furthermore, the Court stated that the rule of reason doctrine did not mean
that competition itself was unreasonable and possibly dangerous to human safety. Rather, "the
inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition." Id. at 691. After restating Justice
Brandeis's formulation of the rule of reason, supra note 159, the Court highlighted the significant aspects of that formulation: "Competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the
facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed."
Id. at 692.
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balancing of the restraint's intrabrand anticompetitive effects against its interbrand procompetitive effects.' 61 The Court concluded that although nonprice vertical market restraints reduce intrabrand competition, 61 manufac-

turers have an economic interest in preserving as much intrabrand competition as is necessary to remain competitive at the interbrand level.' 63 Consequently, the Sylvania Court held that nonprice vertical market restraints had

sufficient redeeming competitive benefits to remove them from the per se
"pernicious effect" classification.

164

Since the Sylvania decision, federal courts of appeals have determined the
legality of nonprice vertical restraints by undertaking wide-ranging inquiries

into the competitive effects of these restraints.' 6 In Valley Liquors, however,
161. 433 U.S. at 49, 53 n.21, 59. For definitions of intrabrand and interbrand competition,
see supra note 158. In 1978, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department adopted the
requirement that under Sylvania, a restraint's effect on intrabrand and interbrand competition
must be balanced. The Deputy Director remarked:
Sylvania's rule of reason analysis dictates that we weigh the effect of vertical restraints
in reducing intrabrand competition against possible benefits these restrictions may
have on promoting interbrand competition. If the benefits outweigh the adverse
effects, then the restraints are reasonable. In making this analysis, the Antitrust
Division is likely to look primarily at three factors: (1) the market power of the
company imposing the restraints; (2) the extent to which the restraints impede intrabrand competition; and (3) the justifications asserted for the restraints in terms
of promoting interbrand competition.
Favretto, Antitrust Division Views on GTE Sylvania, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
50,370,
55,801 (1978).
162. 433 U.S. at 54 ("Vertical restraints reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number
of sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers.").
163. Id. at 54-56. Nonprice vertical restraints were presumed to benefit interbrand competition by permitting manufacturers to achieve certain efficiencies in distributing their products,
such as inducing competitive promotional activities among dealers at the intrabrand level. The
Sylvania Court also noted that nonprice vertical restraints eliminate the problems of "free
riders"-those who fail to invest in promotional or service-related activities without being forced
to do so. For further analysis of the free-rider problem, see infra note 175 and accompanying
text. Finally, the Sylvania Court endorsed the economists' argument that "manufacturers have
an economic interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the
efficient distribution of their products." Id. at 56.
164. Id. at 58-59; see supra note 158.
165. See, e.g., Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981)
(duty under Sylvania "is to determine, on balance, [whether the restraint] had an anticompetitive
effect on the market"); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1980) (looking
to the history of the restraint, the problem perceived by the manufacturer, the goal sought
to be achieved, and the actual effect of the restraint, a court "must weight any enhancement
of interbrand competition against the restrictive effect on intrabrand competition, and determine whether the restraints are, in all circumstances, reasonable"); Sherman v. British Leyland
Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 449 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Primary considerations are whether the intent of the restraint is anticompetitive and whether the restraint itself has significant anticompetitive effects."); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("the
anticompetitive evils of the challenged practice must be carefully balanced against its 'procompetitive virtues' to ascertain whether the former outweigh the latter"); Oreck Corp. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 132 n.6 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (the finder of fact must balance
the anticompetitive evils and procompetitive virtues of the restraint), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
946 (1978).
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the Seventh Circuit expressed a different view of Sylvania's rule of reason

standard for such restraints. To reach this novel view, the court transformed
several economic theories into antitrust norms that were inconsistent with
the limited factual record before the court.
2. The Decision in Valley Liquors

Valley claimed that because intrabrand price competition would be lessened,
the termination of its wholesale distributorship in the northern counties of
Illinois was the product of an unreasonable restraint of trade under section
1 of the Sherman Act. 6 In appealing the denial for preliminary injunctive
relief, Valley alleged that the district court erred in holding that a plaintiff
who demonstrates an impairment of intraband competition has the additional
burden of demonstrating an impairment of interbrand competition. 6 ' Valley
166. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 743, 744 (7th Cir. 1982).
167. Brief for Appellant at 24-32, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d
742 (7th Cir. 1982). Valley further alleged that the district judge erred in requiring direct proof
that a covert conspiracy to increase the wholesale prices of Renfield products existed between
Renfield and two of Valley's competitors. Id. at 32-42. Under this claim, Valley contended
that its termination was the result of a "horizontal conspiracy," a conspiracy among firms
to exclude one of the competitors of a conspirator. Such conspiracies are per se illegal under
§ I of the Sherman Act. See Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 1982);
Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1074-75 (7th Cir.
1981); Alloy Int'l Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1980);
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 170 (3d Cir. 1979). In order to establish
the inference of an illicit horizontal conspiracy, Valley presented unrebutted evidence that its
termination came after separate meetings between Renfield and each of Valley's competing
distributors. At these meetings, the distributors expressed to Renfield their disfavor with the
proposed distributorship realignment program that Renfield was considering. 678 F.2d at 743.
Valley asserted that these distributors, who were two of the largest sales volume distributors
in Illinois, accepted the realignment after learning that Valley, their price competitor, was no
longer going to be present in the northern Illinois market. Brief for Appellee at 7, Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982). This assertion was supported
by evidence indicating that retailers of Renfield's products heard rumors of Valley's termination even before Valley was notified of the termination. Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982).
Judge Posner rejected the inference of a conspiracy and speculated that Renfield may have
had other legitimate reasons, such as eliminating a free rider, for terminating Valley's distributorship. 678 F.2d at 744. For arguments against classifying Valley as a free rider, see infra notes
175-79 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Judge Posner stated that in order to establish
the claim of an illicit conspiracy, there must be evidence that Renfield assented to its distributors'
desires when it terminated Valley. 678 F.2d at 744. This statement suggests that a requirement
of direct evidence is necessary to establish a conspiracy in restraint of trade; such a proposition
is contrary to most authority. See, e.g., Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens,
Inc., 394 U.S. 700, 703-04 (1969) (per curiam) (rejecting the requirement of direct evidence
as essential in antitrust conspiracy cases); Theatre Enter., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954) (recognizing that circumstantial evidence is often the only means
to uncover the covertness inherent in conspiracies in restraint of trade); Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 211 (1939) (directevidence to show § I conspiracy in restraint
of trade not necessary); Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods., 638 F.2d 1061,
1074-75 (7th Cir. 1981) (preposterous to require a "smoking gun" in order to establish § I
claim of conspiracy in restraint of trade). Courts have long recognized that antitrust conspiracies
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contended that under the rule of reason, the plaintiff has the initial burden
of showing anticompetitive impact in the intrabrand market. If this burden
is met, the defendant then has the burden of showing that its restraint
achieves competitive results. 6
Writing for the majority, Judge Posner rejected Valley's claim that its
termination was unreasonable. This rejection was based on the following
theoretical paradigm: a supplier's decision to terminate a distributor enhances
efficiency because the decision is motivated by a desire to establish a proper
relationship between price and nonprice competition among its distributors.'69
Therefore, under this model, the termination of the distributorship was procompetitive. This conclusion was necessarily premised on the notion that vertical market restraints are presumptively procompetitive because they increase
the sales of the supplier's product.' Judge Posner used these theoretical
may be inferred from the parties' actions. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208, 221 (1939) ("It is an unrealistic proposition that a defendant will provide the plaintiff with direct evidence of an explicit agreement between the supplier and the plaintiff's competitors which is specifically aimed at the plaintiff."); see also Eiger, Antitrust Decisions Concerning Supplier-Dealer Relations and the Rule of Reason, 58 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 251, 254
(1982).
Furthermore, although Judge Posner recognized that the Seventh Circuit had adopted the
legal position that it is unlawful per se for a supplier to terminate a distributor at the request
of competing distributors who want to reduce price competition, he questioned the viability
of that position. 678 F.2d at 744. His questioning was understandable, however, in light of
the fact that his academic writings clearly conflict with the Seventh Circuit's position. See,
e.g., Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 19-20 (dealers should be allowed collectively to persuade their suppliers to restrict competition if the restriction would increase sales
to the supplier; mere joint action is immaterial because a supplier's dealers have the incentive
to identify those who fail to compete in nonprice activities while engaging in effective price
competition).
168. 678 F.2d at 744.
169. Id. at 143-44. For an identical argument presented by Judge Posner in his academic
writings, see Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 31, at 23-24.
170. 678 F.2d at 742-43. Judge Posner stated that Valley's termination resulted from a decision to emphasize nonprice competition over price competition; presumably this decision was
made in an effort to achieve greater sales. Id. Under the perfect competition model, the attainment of greater sales is the means by which a firm maximizes its profits. See supra notes
20-22 and accompanying text. A firm will continue to produce until the point at which its
marginal revenue equals its marginal costs. Marginal revenue is defined as the change in the
total revenue the firm receives as a result of selling one additional unit: Marginal Revenue
(MR) = change in total revenue/change in quantity sold. Marginal cost is defined as the change
in cost attributable to producing one more unit of output: Marginal Cost (MC) = change in
total cost/change in quantity. See Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975
DUKE L.J, 1, 22-23.
An important point to remember is that under economic theory, costs include a normal rate
of return for the capital invested and a normal imputed wage for owner-managers. Thus, both
explicit and implicit costs are recognized. Firms like to maximize the number of units sold
because implicit in each product is a normal rate of profit. Underlying this theme is the idea
that the capitalist deserves to receive an average profit for providing the necessary capital for
production. Socialist economists, however, argue that the productivity of capital goods does
not imply that the person supplying the capital is productive nor does such productivity imply
that the individual deserves to retain a profit. Rather, profits should be dispersed among members
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presuppositions both to justify his finding that the restraint was reasonable
and to reject Valley's contention that a shift in burdens of proof was required under the rule of reason.' Hence, it is necessary to consider whether
these presuppositions were applicable to the facts presented in Valley Liquors.
Consistent with his previous academic writings, Judge Posner equated Renfield's decision to adopt a restricted distribution system with the desire to
emphasize nonprice over price competition.' Judge Posner concluded that
in order to counter its relatively poor sales performance in Illinois,' Renfield terminated Valley's distributorship, thereby ensuring that necessary levels
of promotional and service activities-nonprice competition-would be provided by its other distributors."' This conclusion was premised on Judge
Posner's speculation that Valley was "free riding" on the promotional efforts
of the other two distributors in the market;'7 however, the only evidence
of the society. See S. ROBINSON, AN ESSAY ON MARXIAN ECONOMICS 18 (1960).
The competitive firm is a price taker because, by definition, it lacks the ability to affect
the market price. Consequently, its selling price is already determined by the market. F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 12-13 (3d ed. 1973). Its production costs
are also assumed to be constant, at least in the short run. Thus, the only variable cost recognized
under this model is the cost of distribution. Kellman, supra note 151, at 1114.
As a price taker, the competitive firm seeks to maximize the number of goods sold at the
lowest cost. Since its output at the given price is determined by cost, the firm hopes to minimize
the amount of distribution costs required to sell at a point where MR = MC. At that point,
the firm will achieve productive efficiency, or the lowest cost of resources (i.e., plant and raw
materials) for the unit of goods sold. Thus, with all of these assumptions about a competitive
market, Chicago school theorists, employing microeconomic principles, argue that a supplier
will not impose a restraint that leads to a decrease in the number of goods sold because it
will not achieve its objective of maximizing profit. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 415-16 (1966).
For a critique of these assumptions, especially the fact that the mere ability to impose a restraint
implies that the firm has some market power, see infra notes 197-99.
171. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
172. 678 F.2d at 743-44. For previous writings expressing this viewpoint, see R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 147-66; Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note
31, at 5-10.
173. Renfield's sales had grown nationally for four consecutive years. In contrast, no sales
growth occurred in Illinois. Brief for the Appellee at 7, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers,
Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982).
174. 678 F.2d at 743-44.
175. Id. This is the so-called free-rider problem which, according to Chicago school theorists,
supports the economic benefits of manufacturer-imposed vertical restraints. The basis of the
Chicago school view is that one distributor may provide certain services (e.g., advertising, pointof-purchase sales, displays, informational services, product services) and then discover that the
consumer, after benefiting from these services, bought the product from a second distributor
who failed to invest in these services and therefore could afford to sell at a lower price. Imposing
vertical restraints on its distributors, the supplier could achieve effective nonprice competition
between them by, for example, granting an exclusive territory with the stipulation that it would
be revoked if a distributor failed to provide promotional and servicing activities. By eliminating
intrabrand competition, the restraints ensure that a supplier will invest in the optimum level
of customer services. The argument supporting the use of vertical restraints to combat free
riders originated in Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON.
86 (1960). For Judge Posner's thoughts on this subject, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 145-66.
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to support this inference was that Valley sold Renfield's products at prices
that were five percent below those charged by Renfield's other distributors.' 6
The premise that Valley was a free rider was not factually corroborated.' 77
Valley was the most effective distributor in terms of providing retailers with
the lowest priced product. Furthermore, the inference that Valley was a free
rider was explicitly rejected by the testimony of Renfield's national account
manager. ' Moreover, Judge Posner ignored the fact that there may be
reasons other than a desire to emphasize nonprice competition that encourage
a manufacturer to restrict its distribution system.' 79 For example, a manufac176. 678 F.2d at 743. In Sylvania, the Supreme Court partly justified its decision to overturn
Schwinn's per se rule against vertical restraints by noting that a manufacturer-supplier may
use such restrictions to ensure that its distributor will provide the necessary levels of promotional activities and service. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55
(1977) (citing Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 285). Since
this declaration, Judge Posner has been advocating that the free-rider concept necessitates the
adoption of a per se rule of legality for all vertical restraints, including both price and nonprice
restrictions. See Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 31, at 11-13. If this is an economically
sound extension of the free-rider concept, then it appears that the Supreme Court has not
fully adopted the concept as it is advocated in Posner's writings. The Sylvania Court explicitly
reaffirmed its position that vertical price restraints are per se illegal. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
177. Evidence introduced at trial showed that Valley was an aggressive and successful promoter of Renfield products. Valley sold 50-60% of all Renfield products in the area from
which it was terminated. Brief for Appellant at 7, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers,
Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982). Additionally, it is questionable whether a free-rider problem even exists in the wholesale liquor industry. Such problems generally arise when substantial
expenditures are required to obtain maximum sales. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court, supra note 31, at 284 (a free rider's prices are lower because he does not invest in
substantial promotional and service expenditures). The wholesale liquor industry apparently does
not require distributors to invest in customer services such as a service department or an elaborate
showroom. Furthermore, none of the evidence introduced showed that Renfield required its
distributors to provide a minimum level of customer services or that Valley failed to provide
a reasonable amount of promotional expenditures.
178. Mr. Sussman, Renfield's National Accounts Manager, testified that Valley generated
"a tremendous amount of on-sale business," serviced retailed outlets properly, and was Renfield's "best distributor" in the counties in which it was terminated. Brief for Appellant at
7, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982). There also
was testimony that Valley was both the most aggressive distributor in its sales efforts and the
lowest priced distributor. Its prices were not set by the standard mark-up procedures employed
by its competition; rather, they were set according to what would sell the most at what price
(an example of classic competitive pricing). Id. at 12. Furthermore, Valley's service did not
suffer because it provided the lowest priced product. Uncontested testimony demonstrated that
while "Valley deliverled] to every customer every day any amount of merchandise that they
would like," the others required specified minimum quantities for delivery on a limited number
of days. Id. at 13.
179. A manufacturer might be motivated to restrict its distribution system in an effort to
minimize costs or to terminate a price-cutter who upset a cartel at the manufacturers' level.
Bork, supra note 170, at 411 (emphasizing that a manufacturers' cartel arises when only one
brand is carried by retailers). Furthermore, the manufacturer may be forced to terminate the
price-cutter at the insistence of powerful retailers. Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for
Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L.
REV. 461, 505-06 (1979) (suggesting that in many cases large national retailers have sufficient
bargaining power to influence the decisions of their suppliers). A single retailer or distributor
can exert pressure on its supplier in the same way that a cartel of dealers can. The existence
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turer may seek to differentiate its product by eliminating price competitive
distributors in an effort to make its product more exclusive. Through differentiation, a manufacturer can achieve some degree of control over the
price of its product,"'8 thereby dismissing the assumption under the perfect
competition model that sellers lack the ability to control price."0 ' Consequently, by deciding to accept nonprice competition as the guiding force
behind the termination of Valley's distributorship, the Seventh Circuit
arguably usurped the role of the fact finder and drew legal conclusions that
were not based upon the factual record. The classification of Valley as a
free rider was clearly a device used by Judge Posner, writing for the majority,
to achieve the predetermined ideological result that vertical restraints are per
se legal.' 82
In addressing the burden of proof issue, Judge Posner disagreed with
Valley's claim that the rule of reason requires a shifting of burdens and,
accordingly, held that the plaintiff initially must show an anticompetitive
effect in both the intrabrand and interbrand market.' 83 Nevertheless, he
reasoned that requiring the plaintiff to prove anticompetitive effects by
weighing all of the criteria in both the intrabrand and interbrand markets
would impose an undue hardship. To avoid this hardship, Judge Posner
adopted a "shortcut" in which the initial burden is satisfied if the plaintiff
can prove an adverse effect on intrabrand competition coupled with a showing that the defendant possesses significant power in the interbrand market.' 84
of powerful retailers in this country is evident in many industries. See Strasser, Vertical TerritorialRestraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J.
775, 789, 817. The two distributors in competition with Valley were the largest liquor distributors
in the state. See supra note 167. This fact makes the foregoing rationale viable in the Valley
Liquors case.
180. Product differentiation, whether real or imaginary, enables a firm to achieve a less elastic
demand for its product based on a perception that the product lacks an adequate substitute.
Consequently, a higher price may result. See, e.g., Comanor, Vertical, Territorialand Customer
Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 142.2-27 (1968) (product
differentiation often results in reduced interbrand price competition). Some commentators argue
that competitive evils such as increased prices, market power, concentrated markets, and potential
monopoly profits arise from product differentiation. See Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest:
Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86, YALE L.J. 974, 998-99 (1977). Others argue that product
differentiation, with its necessary advertising expenditures, provides consumers with well-defined
choices and promotes informed decision making. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 31, at 113-25 (identifying the importance of information exchanges). For a discussion of
advertising and its role in fostering market power, see infra note 232. For an elaboration on
product differentiation, see infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
183. 678 F.2d at 745.
184. Id. The court provided a theoretical argument for requiring the plaintiff to show that
the defendant holds significant market power. This argument presupposes that a firm lacking
market power cannot adversely affect the price level because even if the firm adopts practices
that are harmful to consumers, "market retribution will be swift." Id. The competitive process
will not allow these uncompetitive practices to go unabated because the market will provide
the consumer with other products to purchase. For a development of this argument, see Posner,
Per Se Legality, supra note 31, at 16.
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Imposing this initial evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to prove an
unreasonable nonprice vertical market restraint is unprecedented.' 8 Before
a defendant's nonprice vertical restraint can be considered unreasonable, the
plaintiff must make a preliminary showing that the defendant has significant market power. This evidentiary burden negates the underlying value
of section 1 of the Sherman Act: to insure that competition, not collusive

restraints, determines success in the marketplace. 8 A practice can be illegal
185. Before Valley Liquors, the Seventh Circuit had not indicated what evidence was required by the plaintiff in a dealer termination case to show adverse impact on competition
under the rule of reason. See Eiger, supra note 167, at 258-63. In Valley Liquors, the court
relied on two cases which supposedly required a showing of market power in order to find
anticompetitive effect. The first case was Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292
(5th Cir. 1981). The Muenster Butane court determined that (1) the record indicated that interbrand competition increased; and (2) because the plaintiff found another supplier of the same
product that the defendant distributed, intrabrand competition was not adversely affected. Id.
at 296-98. Consequently, termination of the plaintiff for continual violations of a local clause
agreement was reasonable.
Muenster Butane can be distinguished factually from Valley Liquors. In Valley Liquors, the
plaintiff's termination was not due to its persistent violation of contract clauses. This alone
is enough to conclude that the case is inapplicable because under the rule of reason "conclusions reached by courts in one context are not necessarily applicable in another." Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts., Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing United States
v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 U.S. 665, 667-68 (1964)); see also Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 124 (1948); L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST LAW 186-92 (1977); 1 VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS §§ 6-02[l], 6-02[4] (1978).

In dictum, the Muenster Butane court noted that had the plaintiff been required to show
that the defendant possessed market power, the case may have been disposed of with less time
and expense. 651 F.2d at 298. Because the court found that the restraint was reasonable, however,
it never adopted this standard. Furthermore, the court noted that cases within its circuit had
not actually established this requirement. Id.
The second case cited by Judge Posner was Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1980). Cowley involved a suit by a retailer against its ex-supplier of windmills. The court
rejected the plaintiff's claim that when a defendant with substantial market power restrains
its distributors, the defendant has the burden of proving that the vertical restraint is unreasonable.
Id. at 754-55. The Cowley court found that the defendant controlled 70 to 80% of the windmill market. This evidence was necessary to substantiate the plaintiff's additional claim of a
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. For a discussion of § 2 of the Sherman Act, see infra
notes 189-90 and accompanying text. The court, however, did not apply the "shortcut" tests
of requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant possessed market power in order recover
under § 1. Thus, it is unclear how Cowley supports Judge Posner's position.
186. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Supreme Court held
that the defendant's preferential routing clauses, which compelled its lessees to ship all of their
commodities over the defendant's railroad lines, were unreasonable per se under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Justice Black enunciated the classic definition of the purposes of the antitrust
laws, specifically § I of the Sherman Act:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests
on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions.
Id. at 4.
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under section 1 of the Sherman Act even if it is imposed by a firm with

less than substantial market power." 7 The objective of section 1 is to curtail
unnecessarily restrictive practices among competitors that could not be

eliminated unilaterally. 88' Consequently, an inquiry under section 1 focuses
on agreements in restraint of competitive conditions, while an inquiry under
section 2 involves an analysis of the structural condition in the market.' 9
Although both sections seek to eradicate practices that can lead to unjustified

market control, only section 2 is limited by a threshold requirement of market
power.' 90 Accordingly, the "shortcut" proposed by the Valley Liquors court

187. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Supreme Court
held that a § 1 violation occurred when the defendant oil producers conspired to purchase
excess oil to stabilize the price of gasoline. The Court found that even though the defendants
did not have control of the market, their acts were illegal since they directly interfered with
the market's price setting function. Id. at 221. Even though it was established that the defendants actually did affect the price of gasoline, the Court noted, in dictum, that they would
still be guilty of a § I violation even if they lacked the power to fix prices. Id. at 224-26
n.59. In this suggestive footnote, the Court reaffirmed the established principle that § 1 condemns an illicit conspiracy regardless of whether the participants had the ability to accomplish
the conspiracy's ends.
It is useful to quote the Court on its distinction between a § I and a § 2 offense:
The existence or exertion of power to accomplish the desired objective ... becomes
important only in cases where the offense charged is the actual monopolizing of
any part of trade or commerce in violation of § 2 of the Act. An intent and power
to produce the result which the law condemns are then necessary. . . . Only a
confusion between the nature of the offenses under those two sections . . . would
lead to the conclusion that power to fix prices was necessary for proof of a pricefixing conspiracy under § 1.
Id. at 226. Consequently, § I is concerned with culpable behavior, not with power in the market.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is concerned with market power. See infra notes 189-90 and
accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 160-61 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(maximum price schedules by which defendant's distributors could sell its papers violate the
Sherman Act).
189. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty.
... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). To establish
a violation of § 2, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had market power plus an intent
to exert monopoly pressures on the market. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570-71 (1966).
Section 2 is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is mentioned merely to show that market
power is not a requirement under § 1; rather, it is a threshold requirement under § 2. For
an extensive analysis of monopolization cases and their governing doctrines, see III P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAWS, ch. 6-7 (1978); see also P. ASCH, EcoNoMic THEORY AND
THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 240 (1970) (the Sherman Act does not prohibit monopoly power but
rather deems those acts that create or continue monopoly power to be illegal). A thorough
review of attempts to monopolize and illegal use of monopoly power is provided in Cooper,
Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of
Section Two, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 373 (1974). For an historical review on the development of
monopoly law under § 2 and its relationship to other antitrust laws, see Rostow, Monopoly
Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REV. 745 (1949).
190. See supra note 189.
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superimposes upon section 1 a previously nonexistent requirement to prove
substantial market power. 9'
The consequence of Valley Liquors's evidentiary standard is that it greatly restricts the application of antitrust laws to nonprice vertical restraints.
If a manufacturer lacks the "power to raise [its] prices significantly above
the competitive level,''' 9 2 it can impose any nonprice restraint on its
distributors without fear of being prosecuted under the antitrust laws. 93' If
a distributor seeks protection under the Sherman Act from the coercive
pressures created by a supplier's restraint, the distributor must be able to
prove that the restraint unreasonably affects both the intrabrand and interbrand market. 9 ' This initial burden is enough to discourage most potential
litigants, even if their independence is severely curtailed by such restraints.
By requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the restraint's adverse impact
on both the intrabrand and interbrand market," 5 the Seventh Circuit circumvented the rule of reason's mandate that the precise facts of each case
must be analyzed before determining the restraint's competitive effect. 96 Such
facts arguably include the relationship between the distributor and the supplier,"I7
191. Judge Posner demonstrated his distaste for § 2 when he proposed that it be discarded.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 7, 217. According to Judge Posner,
§ 2-type violations can be adequately protected against under § I because "[i]f a firm has
engaged in a practice which is unreasonably restrictive of competition, it has violated Section
1 regardless of whether monopoly has been achieved." Id. at 216. Although abandoning § 2
of the Sherman Act would require statutory reform, Judge Posner believes that much of
the antitrust doctrine could be "changed by the courts within the very broad limits set by
statutory language and what we know of the intent behind it." Id. at 7. This opinion would
lead to the elimination of § 2 offenses by incorporating them into § I. Id. at 212-17. His
judicial approach in Valley Liquors, which merges § 1 and § 2 by requiring the plaintiff to
show market power, is reminiscent of Judge Posner's expressed belief that the courts should
begin restricting the antitrust law's scope. For a criticism of how Judge Posner would implement judicial changes in antitrust law, see infra notes 274-89 and accompanying text.
192. 678 F.2d at 745 (Judge Posner's definition of market power).
193. Id. "Even if there is some possibility that the distribution practices of a powerless firm
will have a substantial anticompetitive effect, it is too small a possibility to warrant trundling
out the great machinery of antitrust enforcement." Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. The rule of reason formulation offered by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), provided a broad statement of the facts to be
analyzed. See supra note 159. This view has also been explicitly adopted in the Court's subsequent opinions. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
687-92 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
197. Vertical restraints imply that a supplier has achieved some control over distribution
through a contractual relationship. In evaluating this relationship, it may be revealed that the
supplier imposed restraints upon distributors by exerting its unequal bargaining position. The
supplier's power to control distribution could be the result of its entrenchment in the national
market, or its insulation from potential competitors because of protective entry barriers, while
the distributor remains forced to compete in a generally localized market with a greater potential for new competitors due to less stringent entry barriers. Kellman, supra note 151, at 1120
("distributor who lacks bargaining power cannot be expected to resist the manufacturer's insistence on the restriction" since he knows that another distributor can be found if he declines
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the severity of the restraint on the distributor's independence,' 9 the structure
of the industry affected,' 99 the type of restraints used by competitors at the interbrand level,"' and the availability of less restrictive alternatives that can meet
the needs of the supplier."0 ' In light of Sylvania's recognition that vertical restraints generally promote interbrand competition at the expense of intrabrand
competition, a lower level of presumptive illegality may be appropriate for nonprice vertical market restraints.2 0 ' Nonetheless, it should be noted that the
Sylvania Court did not impose a rule of presumptive, or per se, legality
203
for such restraints.
Although Judge Posner does not explicitly declare that nonprice vertical
market restraints are per se legal, his analysis in Valley Liquors exhorts such
a standard. He completely eliminates distributors' antitrust actions against
suppliers lacking market power at the interbrand level.2 0 4 Judge Posner's proclamation of the inherent benefits of restrictions on distribution, 0 5 coupled
the contractual agreement). Conversely, in today's era of sophisticated mass distribution, the
distributor may have a bargaining edge on the manufacturer. That is, a manufacturer may
be forced into restricting its distribution in order to appease a powerful distributor's desire
to eliminate competitors.
198. The effect of the restraint on the distributor's independent business judgment is usually
reflected in the threat of termination for failure to abide by the conditions of the restraint.
See, e.g., id. at 1121-22 (highlighting the dire consequences a distributor may face if terminated,
including the possibility of going out of business). For additional discussion on the value of
business independence under the antitrust laws, see infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
199. The existence of a vertical restraint necessarily implies that the market is not perfectly
competitive. Under the perfect competition model, there is a large number of producers making
identical products. Any effort to control the distributor's function would result in the distributor
substitution of another product made by a different producer. Therefore, for the restraint to
be effective, the producer must have some market power. With market power existing in individual entities, the concept of perfect competition is absent. See Carstensen, Vertical Restraints
and the Schwinn Doctrine: Rules for the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 771, 777-78 (1976).
Consequently, in determining the extent to which the industry deviates fiom being perfectly
competitive, an analysis of industry structure is required. Such an analysis provides valuable
information on whether the restraint in question fosters or detracts from competitive conditions.
200. Cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961) (exclusive dealing
case which notes the absence of "a seller with a dominant position in the market" or "myriad
outlets with substantial sales volume, coupled with an industry wide practice").
201. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271-72 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (noting that the availability of less restrictive alternatives has always been a
basic consideration under the rule of reason).
202. The Sylvania Court identified several redeeming virtues of nonprice vertical restraints
that justified abandoning a per se illegality approach to such restriction. Thus, the reason for
applying a per se illegal standard-that the time and expense necessary to identify the utility
of the restraint is unwarranted-was not met in the case of nonprice vertical restraints. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1977); see also supra notes 157-59
and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Bohling, supra note 179, at 502-03 (identifying the Court's refusal to apply
a rule of per se legality despite the fact that many commentators argue for abandoning the
per se illegality approach).
204. 678 F.2d at 745.
205. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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with the ease with which he characterizes Valley as a free rider,20 6 implies
a willingness to validate nonprice vertical restraints even if the supplier has
substantial market power. This implication is strengthened by the requirement that a plaintiff alleging an unreasonable nonprice vertical market
restraint must initially prove anticompetitive effects in both the intrabrand
and interbrand market. 20'
An examination of Judge Posner's academic writings reveals his perception that nonprice vertical market restraints are procompetitive and should
be per se legal under the antitrust laws.2"8 Judge Posner's deeply entrenched
viewpoint on the validity of nonprice vertical market restraints makes it difficult to imagine that he would apply any standard other than per se legality. Similarly, Judge Posner's previous writings insist that vertical price
restraints should also be presumptively legal. 209 Yet, the Supreme Court's
animosity toward any practice that interferes directly with the price
mechanism, 2 ' and the Court's insistence that nonprice vertical market

206. For an examination of Judge Posner's declaration that Valley was a free rider, see supra
notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
207. 678 F.2d at 745.
208. See R. POSNER, EcoNoMIc PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 147-67; Posner, Per Se Legality,
supra note 31, at 22-24; Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 16-18; Posner, Anti-

trust Policy and the Supreme Court, supra note 31, at 283-99.
209. Posner previously argued that a per se legality standard was justified for all vertical
restraints. See Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 31, at 9-14. The claim is that price restraints
are no more inhibitory than exclusive territories. Id. at 9. Thus, price restraints can be motivated
by similar desires of manufacturers to rid themselves of free riders, see supra note 174, and
to achieve greater efficiencies by keeping down their distributive costs. See also Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1982) (all intrabrand restrictions should be per se legal regardless of their form or genesis).
Since 1911, the Supreme Court has held that minimum resale prices are per se illegal under
the Sherman Act. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
The Court subsequently extended the per se rule to encompass vertical agreements that establish
a maximum resale price. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
Several economic reasons have been presented in justification of the per se rule. One of
the original reasons was that such practices had the effect, if not the purpose, of horizontally
fixing the price of goals. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408
(1911). Additionally, such practices may be employed at the insistence of a distributor cartel.
See Bowman, The Prerequisitesand Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
825, 830-31 (1955). It has also been noted that price restraints "reduce not only intrabrand,
but also interbrand price competition by eliminating a dealer's flexibility in its pricing
arrangements." White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Finally, there exists the impracticality of placing the courts in the position of determining what is a reasonable price. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment against all practices that are explicitly
directed at the "central nervous system" of competitive market pricing. See Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (applying per se rule to a maximum fee setting
arrangement among member doctors, even though the express purpose was to compete more
effectively with existing health insurance plans).
210. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (reversing Ninth
Circuit holding that a horizontal agreement to fix credit terms does not contravene the antitrust laws); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (vertical
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restraints are to be analyzed under the rule of reason standard,2"' prevent
Judge Posner from judicially proclaiming a per se legality standard. Nevertheless, in his future rulings on vertical restraints, it can be expected that
Judge Posner will continue to apply the methodical, restrictive delineation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act as outlined in Valley Liquors.
COMPETITION UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS:

TIE IMPLICATIONS
OF JUDGE POSNER'S DEFINITION

A. A Posnerian Definition
Relying on the Supreme Court's declaration that "[tihe essence of the antitrust laws is to ensure fair price competition in an open market," 2 2 Judge
Posner has repeatedly emphasized that the sole objective of the antitrust
statutes is to protect consumer welfare through preserving competition. 2 3
Judge Posner's definition of competition is purely economic. In Products

Liability Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co.,2 4 the
plaintiff claimed that his products liability insurance brokerage business for
ladder manufacturers was terminated as a result of an illicit conspiracy
between his ex-employer insurance agency and its underwriter. 2 5 In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, Judge Posner reached the following conclusions: (1) no conspiracy was proven; and (2) even if a conspiracy

could be found, there was no showing of any anticompetitive effects. 2 6 This
price restraints are per se illegal) (dictum); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)
(agreements to fix maximum price are per se illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) ("for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principal that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se").
211. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977). The Court explicitly
stated that under the rule of reason, "the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited." Id. at 49.
212. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979).
213. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir.
1982); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1095 (7th Cir.
1982); Products Liab. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 660, 663-64 (7th Cir.
1982); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
Judge Posner's reliance on Reiter v. Sontone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), is misplaced. In
that case, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's ruling that only those injuries sustained in a commercial context can be redressed. The Court liberally interpreted § 4
of the Clayton Act and allowed standing to a consumer who was forced to pay a higher
price for a hearing aid as the result of an allegedly illegal price-fixing conspiracy. Rather than
limiting § 4's requirement of an injury to the "business or property" of those engaged in
commercial enterprises, the Reiter Court concluded that Congress intended to provide consumers with the right to sue for deprivations of competitive processes. -1d. at 342-44. Thus,
while the Supreme Court's expansive reading of § 4 provided consumers with standing to sue
for damages they incurred from anticompetitive activities, Judge Posner read consumer welfare
as a constructive limitation on the range of antitrust law objectives.
214. 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982).
215. Id. at 661-62. The case was dismissed by the district court in favor of the defendant
after completion of pretrial discovery. Id. at 663.
216. Id. at 663.
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second conclusion was based on the premise that competition, for purposes
of antitrust analysis, is concerned with consumer welfare and not with the
welfare of individual competitors." 7 Consequently, even if the plaintiff suffered financial injury at the hands of conspirators in the insurance industry,
Posner would conclude that no antitrust cause of action existed because consumers were not adversely affected; the demand and supply of products liability insurance for ladder manufacturers presumably remained constant. 2
Judge Posner also concluded that consumers are not concerned with the
number of competitors in the market. Rather, their only concern is that
"there be enough [competitors] to assure [them] competitive price and
quality.'' 21 9
If antitrust plaintiffs are required to abide by this judicial definition of
competition, then plaintiffs excluded from the market must prove (1) their
exclusion affected competition in the marketplace; and (2) consumers were
injured by this effect on competition. Such a standard would devastate private
enforcement of the antitrust laws because it effectively requires plaintiffs
to prove the efficacy and validity of microeconomic theory in their particular
antitrust suit. Such a burden would be nearly insurmountable for private
plaintiffs. Even if a well-financed individual can overcome this excessive
burden, the judiciary is not an appropriate forum for an empirical debate
on the validity of microeconomic theory. Nonetheless, in order to demonstrate
that Judge Posner's definition of competition is theoretically inconsistent with
nearly one hundred years of antitrust jurisprudence, it is necessary to examine
the differing views of the Chicago school theorists and the Supreme Court
on the values subsumed within the meaning of competition.
B. Chicago School Theory: Its Critics and Its Judicial Limitations
Premised on the Chicago school theorists' evaluation of the antitrust laws
under static microeconomic theory, Judge Posner's definition of competition rests upon his assertion that the most efficient producers should not
be penalized by antitrust liability.22 The Chicago school theorists contend
217. Id. at 664-65; accord Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d
1083, 1095-98 (7th Cir. 1982) (competition in its antitrust sense is not a process whereby rivalry
is robust but, rather, is a consequence of promoting consumer welfare).
218. 682 F.2d at 664. The conclusion that the supply and demand of product liability insurance for ladder manufacturers remained constant was based on the fact that the plaintiff
failed to prove any adverse effects on the competitive conditions of the ladder market. Id.
Reliance on the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate adverse market impact, in order to dismiss
the claim, is of questionable efficacy. A plaintiff is not required to "prove an actual lessening
of competition in order to recover" under § 4 of the Clayton Act because "competitors may
be able to prove antitrust injury before they are driven from the market .. " Blue Shield
v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482 (1982) (quoting Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 n.14 (1977)).
219. 682 F.2d at 664.
220. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. The theory is static because its models
contain highly abstract assumptions that fail to account for environmental and evolutionary
changes which occur in the industry.
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that a monopolized industry results in inefficient resource allocation due to
a lower output of production and a higher market price.22' They further
argue that if competition exists, there will be an increase in supply and a
decrease in price; thus, total consumer satisfaction, as measured by market
prices, will be maximized. 2 '
To Chicago school theorists, the efficiency of market activity identifies
whether the consumers' satisfaction, and hence their welfare, is being met.223
Utilizing the perfect competition and pure monopoly models, economic
welfare would be optimized and resources allocated ideally if efficiency were
recognized as the determinative factor in all legal decisions having economic
implications.22 ' Consequently, the overriding premise of the Chicago school
approach is that to the extent other values are involved in antitrust, they
are to be disregarded if these noneconomic values conflict with efficiency, 2
for it is efficiency that is in the consumer's, and hence society's, best interest.
The proper role for microeconomic theory in antitrust litigation is a matter
of disagreement among Chicago school theorists and those loosely identified
as Harvard theorists.226 The Harvard theorists do not reject efficiency
221. See R.

POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE,

supra note 31, at 8-18. For an explanation

of the effects of a monopoly on the market, see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
222. See Bohling, supra note 179, at 474-75.
223. Efficiency is a term of art that is used generally to indicate some useful, or better,
way of doing things. To the economist, however, efficiency is a technical term, having a productive component-generating a maximum number of goods and services with scarce resourcesand an allocative component-putting scarce resources to their most productive use. Efficiency
has been defined by Judge Posner as "exploiting economic resources in such a way that human
satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay . . . is maximized." R.
POSNER, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 4 (1974). For an evaluation of the normative basis inherent
in this definition, see infra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.

224. See, e.g., R.

BORK,

supra note 27, at 50-71; R.

POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE,

supra

note 31, at 8-22.
225. See, e.g., Bohling, supra note 179, at 474-76; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per
Se Concept: Price-Fixing and Market Division (pt. 1), 74 YALE L.J. 775, 833-47 (1965); Elzinga,
The Goals of Antitrust: Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 1191, 1212 (1977); Flynn, Introduction: Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium
on the Economic, Politicaland Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182,
1185 (1977).
226. See, e.g., Sullivan, Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust, supra note 26, at 1216-18. Judge
Posner wrote an article which was intended to refute the notion that there still exists a distinction between the Chicago and Harvard positions. His basic point was that Harvard theorists
have abandoned their intellectual foundations and have generally merged with Chicago school
theorists. Thus, there is no need to insist that differences exist between the two camps. Posner,
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). Following Judge
Posner's article, a rebuttal written by a Harvard professor delineated some of the theoretical
differences that justify maintaining the labels upon each school of thought. Nelson, Comments
on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1979). This Comment will maintadn the distinction
because it appears that scholars still maintain significant disagreements over the application
of economics to antitrust law. For a classic debate highlighting the distinction between the
two schools of thought, compare Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 363 (1965) (advocating the Chicago school approach) with Blake & Jones, Toward a Three
DimensionalAntitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965) (advocating that economic, social,
and political goals are inherent in the antitrust statutes).
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enhancement as a goal of antitrust; however, they reject the dogmatic posi-

tion that it is the sole aim of antitrust jurisprudence. 2 7 In addition, the Harvard scholars do not agree with the Chicago school theorists' rigid reliance
on static economic models.228 In light of the perceived inadequacy of the

227. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § I at 2-6, 9, 10 (1977); Blake
& Jones, supra note 226; Bohling, supra note 178, at 473-77; Flynn, The Misuse of Economic
Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 335 (1981); Markovitz, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and the Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567,
577-80 (1981); Schwartz, Book Review, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 249-53, 266-68 (1979).
228. It is generally agreed by Harvard economists that microeconomic price theory is necessarily
dependent upon highly abstract assumptions. These economists argue that due to the questionable structural and behavioral assumptions of neoclassical economics, price theory disregards
important deterministic factors incapable of quantification. These structural assumptions were
identified supra note 19-25. In addition to these structural assumptions, price theory is premised on the major behavioral assumption that both individuals and firms are rational maximizers of their self-interest. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (1977). Rationality,
as the prime psychological force, is used in Adam Smith's sense of self-interest. A. SMITH,
supra note 7. For an insight into Smith's philosophical views, which recognize that economics
examines only one aspect of the individual in society, see Lerner, Introduction to A. SMITH,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Microeconomic theory quantifies self-interest in the concept of maximizing utility. See J.
HENDERSON & R. QUANT, supra note 18, at 6. Since microeconomic theory presumes that whatever
decision is made is rational, one need not make any qualitative judgments on any given choice.
See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 227, at 365 ("The individual's perceived reason for a choice is
irrelevant (under microeconomic theory], so are the moral, psychological, or other constraints
influencing the choice."). Rational maximization of self-interest is the only behavioral or
psychological explanation of individual action. See, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 466 (1974). In criticizing Judge Posner's
book Economics and the Law, Leff questions the validity of relying on rational maximization
as the sole motivating force of humankind: "Can one actually, now, write 400 pages about
human desire without adverting to Freud, his followers or his enemies?" Leff, supra, at 466.
For a suggestion that these assumptions lead to great distortions and necessarily limit the applicability of neoclassical economics to legal analysis, see Flynn, supra note 227, at 363-69.
Several preeminent economists have challenged the behavioral postulates of microeconomic
theory as being overly simplistic. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH
1-8 (rev. ed. 1967) (group interaction defies easy categorization); F. HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS
TO GROWTH 60-64 (1976) (questioning whether people really make rational decisions); E. MIsHAN,
THE ECONOMIC GROWTH DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT 14-15, 29-37 (1977) (microeconomics fails
to account for the dynamics of human behavior); J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 81-106 (3d ed. 1950) (self-interest is a capitalistic notion that merely justifies wealth
accumulation). In 1979, Judge Posner attempted to justify the assumption that rational maximization is a valid behavioral postulate. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 301-06 (1979). First, he claimed that "introspection provides the only
reliable evidence of motivation; at the level of unconscious, it appears, without being a Freudian, that humans act out of self-interest." Id. at 302-03. Second, even though the behavioral
assumptions of economic theory are unrealistic, "they do not falsify the studies that utilize
them." Id. at 303.
Judge Posner's first argument in support of the behavioral assumptions upon which
microeconomic theory is constructed ignores psychological theories of human behavior that
prescribe motivations other than self-interest for action. Rather than addressing these psychological
theories which more fully explain human action, he expresses a personal observation on human
character. Judge Posner's second argument expresses a generalization that economics is a concise science because its hypotheses are generally valid. Economics, however, is based on deduc-
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static models upon which price theory is premised, Harvard theorists recognize
that economic theory will be relevant to antitrust policy only if more realistic

economic models, those that recognize the changes that occur within an industry over time, are employed.229 For instance, industrial organization
economists have introduced models explaining the existence of barriers to
entry other than economies of scale, 23 uncertainty by business planners and
tive reasoning, inferring factual situations from general metaphysical propositions. Legal analysis
is inductive; it reasons from the specific to the general. For a development of the distinctions
between deductive and inductive logic, and an argument that the deductive nature of economics
makes it an inappropriate substitution for legal analysis, see Flynn, supra note 227, at 337,
341-47, 353-54. Economics cannot account for human actions based on lust, ambition, generosity,
fear, or a host of other immeasurables which are often present in actual disputes. Michelman,
A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 309-13
(1979). Furthermore, although Judge Posner seems to suggest the opposite in his second argument to justify the behavioral assumptions of economics, the predictions derived from this
economic theory must be corroborated by empirical data, which so far have been unverifiable
and inconclusive. Bohling, supra note 179, at 474-75.
Just as the individual is presumed to maximize his utility, the firm is also presumed to act
as a rational maximizer of its utility; it attempts to maximize profits. J. HENDERSON & R.
QUANT, supra note 18, at 53; J. QuIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra note 18, at 54-60 (assumptions
of business behavior ignore external and internal influences on decision makers). A major advancement in the theory of managerial behavior is the concept of discretionary authority, which
incorporates those choices that are not dictated by, or predicated from, pure profit maximization. Professor Dewey described discretionary authority as "essentially the power to make decisions that affect the lives of other people." Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View,
in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 11 n.18 (H.

Goldschmid,

J. Weston ed. 1974). For a general discussion of discretionary authority, see 0.
THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR:

H.

Mann &

WILLIAMSON,

MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE

FIRM (1964). The existence of discretionary authority flows from the uncertainty in which all
firms act; this premise directly contradicts the price theory's assumption of certainty. Cf. D.
DEWEY, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 154-64 (1969)

(uncertainty abolishes the determination of the pure competition model). Thus, even if shortrun profit maximization is the goal of the firm, decision makers pursue this course with a
great range of choice. See Phillips, A Theory of Interfirm Organization, 74 Q.J. ECON. 602
(1960) (profit maximization lacks predictability).
229. Bernhard, Competition in Law and in Economics, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1099, 2208-17
(1967).
230. Chicago school theorists generally recognize that the only possible barriers to market
entry are efficiencies of scale and governmental action. But see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 92-93 (arguing that there are no true barriers to market entry and
that all existing firms represent potential entrants into another's market). Barriers to entry other
than effiencies of scale and governmental action include growth of demand, high capital requirements, advertising intensity, product differentiation, differing attitudes toward risk, and
access to scarce resources. For a list of economists describing these variables as true barriers
to entry, see Brody, Potential Competition Mergers. A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1,
32 n.123 (1977).
Another major disagreement exists over the neoclassical definition of equilibrium. This definition
assumes that, if left to its own development, the supply and demand of the marketplace inevitably leads to equilibrium in both price and quantity. J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, supra note
18 (entire text deals with the application of equilibrium). Such assumptions, however, fail to
account for the economic and political disequilibrium present in our society. See generally V.
WALSH & H.

GRAM, CLASSICAL AND NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (1980).
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investors,23 ' product differentiation (which accounts for more than competitive
'
profits without conditions of monopoly), 32
and market power.233 To Harvard theorists, perfect competition and pure monopoly are only hypothetical
extremities which are inappropriate theoretical tools for evaluating the
dynamics of economic competition.
As evidenced by this scholarly debate, there is no scientific method for
Severe inequalities may result from a laissez faire approach to the marketplace. See generally
W. WEISSKOPH, ALIENATION AND ECONOMICS 92, 118-30 (1971) (worship of economics obscures
the focus of the legitimate goals of society by eliminating any burden on the corporation to
evaluate its ethics).
231. See H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 91-92 (1970) (due to uncertainty, decision making
is dependent on probability assessments of future uncertainty and risk preference); Note, Decisonmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091, 1100-05 (1976) (depicting
three distinct models of decision making).
232. Product differentiation is a major area of disagreement between orthodox Chicago school
theorists and other economists. The debate has often centered on the effects of advertising.

See Turner, Advertising as an Impediment to Competition: Dialogue, in

INDUSTRIAL CONCEN-

TRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 156 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). Accord-

ing to Chicago school theorists, advertising serves the valuable function of providing consumers
with information necessary to make economic decisions. See, e.g., Posner, The Chicago School
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 938-39 (1979) (advertising decreases consumers'
search costs). Although agreeing that advertising serves a valuable informative function, many
claim that the Chicago school approach fails to recognize the degree of market power that
can be achieved as a result of effective advertising. See R. SCHMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF
ADVERTISING (1972). Despite disagreements regarding the efficacy of information provided by
advertising, empirical data suggests that a positive correlation exists between high levels of advertising expenditures and market power. See Posner, Interbrand Choice, Media Mix and Market
Performance, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 398 (1976). This data suggests that relevant policy judgments
should consider the structural effects which result from advertising. W. COMANOR & T. WILSON,
ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER

(1974); Comanor & Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure,

and Performance, 49 REV. ECON. & STAT. 423 (1967); Schmalensee, Advertising and Profitability:
Further Implications of the Null Hypothesis, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 45 (1976). But see Telser,
Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964) (arguing that advertising is socially
useful and serves to enhance competition).
The major disagreement over advertising and product differentiation lies in the fact that
the market power achieved due to advertising results from the willingness of consumers to
purchase high priced, highly advertised products when lower priced substitutes are available.
Comanor & Wilson, The Effects of Advertising on Competition: A Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT.
453, 472 (1979). The ability to sell at a higher price without being a monopolist suggests the
possibility that demand is not an external force. Microeconomic theory assumes that demand
is a given; it is determined by consumer desires, and all that a firm can do is recognize and

meet such consumer preferences. Carstensen, Vertical Restraints and the Schwinn Doctrine:
Rules for the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 771,
777-82 (1976).
The monopolist can earn greater profits through its ability to control the supply of the product; as supply decreases, prices will rise. Consequently, even the monopolist does not control
the demand when it is able to sell at higher prices. With product differentiation, however,
demand may appear to be a function of the firm's selling efforts. Carstensen, supra, at 771.
Hence, this possibility may serve as the rejection of price theory's foundation in the law of
supply and demand since both may be within the firm's control. Significantly, the market may
not be the allocator of resources that it is assumed to be.
233. For theories that assume the existence of product differentiation and, hence, market
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predicting the actual market effects of a business practice.234 The absence

of such a method is not disastrous, however, because the legal concept of
competition has never been an economic one;"' instead, it has been a standard from which to evaluate business behavior.236 Since it must be applicable
to various situations and changing environments, the imprecision of the legal

standard of competition may be a virtue.213 Viewed in this light, the juxtaposition of the political and economic ideals of competition distinguishes
the law of antitrust from a mere instrumentality designed to measure the
technicalities of industrial efficiency.23 Inherent throughout the development

power, see infra note 232. Industrial organization economists have been concerned with preexisting market structures consisting of competitive conditions. Monopolistic competition was
developed to explain preexisting markets with monopoly characteristics, yet without the attendant conditions of pure monopoly. A monopolistically competitive industry has a large number
of sellers who engage in some amounts of product differentiation. Professor Chamberlin is
credited with establishing the monopolistic competition model. E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY
OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956). Compare E. CHAMBERLIN, TOWARDS A MORE
GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE (1957) (affirming the validity of the monopolistic competition model)
and E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM (1957) (supporting

the monopolistic competition model when an industry has a large number of sellers since this
type of market structure is neither predominantly monopolistic nor predominantly competitive)
with G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968) (finding monopolistic competition
theoretically unsound and reverting to pure theory).
Oligopolistic competition recognizes interdependence among firms in certain markets
characterized by high concentration ratios. Whereas monopolistic competition is closer to perfect
competition, oligopoly is closer to monopoly. Interconnectedness and mutual dependence of
firms characterize an oligopolistic industry. For developments of this theory, see W. BAUMOL,
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (rev. ed. 1967); R. TRIFFIN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY (1940). For a concise review of the oligopoly behavior

models, see E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS

85-111 (1968).
234. See, e.g., I P. AREEDA & S. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 91, 1113 (1976) (authors
acknowledge the inexactitude of economics due to its theoretical gaps and lack of empirical
verification).
235. As early as 1939, Harvard economist Edward Mason noted the great discrepancy between the legal problem of monopoly and the economic theory of monopoly. He concluded
that the discrepancy was warranted because the law was trying to achieve social objectives that
economists could not adequately consider. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE
L.J. 34, 45-46 (1939); see also E. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 332-36 (1957) (distinguishing legal and economic definitions of monopoly and competition).
236. Bernhard, supra note 229, at 1129.
237. Labeling it the "Magna Carta of free enterprise," the Supreme Court has equated the
Sherman Act with the preservation of economic freedom. Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n.19 (1982) (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)). The mere fact that since 1980 the Sherman Act has continually
been used by the courts to strike down anticompetitive conduct is evidence of the act's flexibility to adjust to different environments.
238. The historian Richard Hofstader insightfully grasped the relationship between political
and economic ideals in antitrust when he declared:
What makes it possible to institutionalize antitrust activities at the higher plateau
that has been maintained since 1938 is not a consensus among economists as to
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of antitrust policy is the belief that a self-regulating competitive economy
is necessary to preserve our democratic institutions2 " and to ensure a prosperous nation. 2" Related to these underlying virtues of competition is the
suspicion of concentrated power.24
Another prevalent theme of antitrust policy is the populist notion that
an environment that is conducive to the development of human potential
is one in which everyone has a certain amount of freedom to act and to
make decisions for himself.242 A powerful recognition of this theme was provided by Justice Marshall's inspiring declaration:

its utility in enhancing economic efficiency, but a rough consensus in society at
large as to its value in curbing the dangers of excessive market power. As in the
beginning, it is based on a political and moral judgement rather than economic
measurement of even distinctively economic criteria.
R. HOFSTADER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 188, 233 (1968).
239. Consistent with our constitutional structure of checks and balances within the federal
government, competitive markets serve to prevent private accumulation of economic power that
could undermine democratic procedures. C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 165 (1977). As

a result, the antitrust laws perpetuate the quest to defuse power that is exercised by a single
entity or a consolidated group of interests. Cf. United States v. E. 1.du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390 n.15 (1956) (a market dominated by a few producers would effectively insulate them from the discipline of competition).
240. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1956); see also supra note 186.
241. The suspicion of concentrated power is reflected in the classic statement by Judge Learned
Hand, "Throughout the history of [the antitrust laws] it has been constantly assumed that
one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve for its own sake and in spite of possible
cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other."
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). For a criticism
of the Jeffersonian belief in a system of small producers, see Bork, Legislative Intent and
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (congressional intent was to promote
efficiency). For repeated expressions of the concern with small business, see Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56, 57 n.26 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562, 578 n.12 (1972); United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333-34 (1962); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
Many commentators have argued that the Warren Court used the antitrust laws to forestall
a perceived increase of concentrated economic power. See, e.g., Arnold, The Supreme Court
and -the Antitrust Laws: 1953-1967; 34 ANTITRUST L.J. 2 (1967) (Court appeared to ignore
economic theory completely in its § I decisions); Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 329 (1968) (same).
242. The standard precepts of the perfect competition model envision a large number of
buyers and sellers, thereby preventing any individual from influencing another. Additionally,
there exists complete freedom of entry to, or exit from, the market. Thus, deconcentrated markets
are consistent with the assumptions of microeconomic price theory and the mistrust of social
and political power. See, e.g., H. THORELLI, supra note 16, at 227 (congressional intent was
to maintain business freedom); Bernhard, supra note 229, at 1129-36 (highlighting freedom
of action as a basic concern to both legal and economic conceptions of competition); Blake
& Jones, supra note 226, at 427-36; Bohling, supra note 179, at 465-70 (Supreme Court has
articulated business autonomy and freedom of opportunity as the basic social concerns of the
antitrust laws).
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Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is
to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom
to compete-to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity
whatever economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom is the
notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the
economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such
foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector
of the economy.2 '

As a professor, Judge Posner contended that "although noneconomic
objectives are frequently mentioned in the legislative histories, it seems that
the dominant legislative intent has been to promote some approximation to
the economist's idea of competition, viewed as a means toward the end of
maximizing efficiency." 2 " Most interpretations of the Sherman Act, however,
recognize that its intended goal encompassed more than economic concerns.2"5
From the Act's inception, Congress sought to alleviate the perceived economic
and moral wrongs caused by the massive accumulation of wealth and power
in trusts and combinations." 6 Thus, the antitrust laws were based upon the
recognition that without governmental intervention, the theory of classical
economics would lead to antidemocratic institutions. Consistent with this
recognition, courts may sacrifice perceived efficiencies in a given situation
4
to preserve the overriding values that make economic competition desirable. ,
243. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
244. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 20. Posner relied heavily on Professor Bork's interpretation of the Sherman Act's legislative history. Bork, Legislative Intent
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) (Congress intended the courts
to distinguish between agreements or activities that increase wealth through efficiency and those
that decrease it through restriction of output.)
245. The legislative history of the Sherman Act is rich in political perspectives reflecting
the turn of the century. The debates, however, fail to provide a clearly articulated legislative
intent for the Act. Hans Thorelli's exhaustive examination of the events behind the passage
of the Sherman Act represents the most widely accepted authority on the subject. H. THORELLI,
supra note 16. Thorelli's conclusion is that while a mixture of social, political, and economic
factors existed, no singular congressional intent can be derived. Professor Letwin's analysis
reveals that both broader and vaguer goals motivated enactment of the Sherman Act. W. LETWIN, supra note 14; Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm.
L. REV. 221 (1956); see also Sullivan, Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust, supra note 26, at
1218-23 (economic efficiency could not have been the primary intent behind passage of the
Sherman Act).
The subsequent passage of amendments and additions to the Sherman Act provides additional evidence that Congress intended the antitrust laws to assume a broad political and social
function. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was revised "to aid in preserving small business as
an important competitive factor in the American economy." S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1950); see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962)
(discussing at length the legislative history of § 7).
246. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REc. 2,457, 2,460-61, 2,569 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) (Act
is to be a bulwark against oppression at the hands of the economically powerful).
247. The Supreme Court has asserted that potential economic efficiencies cannot be used
as a defense to illegality. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); accord

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:839

This broad objective of ensuring a competitive economy required equally
broad statutory language. The courts were given the task of delineating the
contours of the statute,2"8 a process inevitably highlighted by doctrinal confusion. As in most other areas of the law that require a balancing of multiple values,249 antitrust analysis is dynamic and typically characterized by the
absence of mechanical rules. The stark simplicity of a single goal of efficiency enhancement, in light of the complexity of antitrust law, weighs against
Judge Posner's claim that economic theory alone should determine legal
conclusions.
In addition to disregarding the pervasive social and political goals of antitrust law, Judge Posner's judicial conception of competition forces him
to disregard contrary precedent. For instance, in Products Liability,25 Judge
Posner completely disregarded the Supreme Court's concern with individual
competitors.2 ' He attempted to classify the Court's holding in Klor's, Inc.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
6, II (1956) (tying arrangement denied competitors their freedom of access into the market
for the tied product and the deprivation of the buyers' choice of products); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309 (1949). See generally United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972) (cooperative association that functioned as a purchasing agent for its
members, thereby enabling the group to compete more effectively against the larger chains,
held to be illegal since it inhibited freedom of competition).
248. 21 CONG. REc. 3, 148 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds) (stating that the Committee
on the Judiciary believed that to attack the trusts legally, terms used in the bill should have
preexisting legal definitions; the courts would then determine "how far they could carry
. . . it's definition as applicable to each particular case")
249. Analogizing the antitrust statutes to constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court has
identified its role in interpreting these laws as similar to its role in developing constitutional
standards. In Appalachian Coals, the Court stated:
As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to' be desirable in constitutional provisions. It does not go
into detailed definitions which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or
through participation defeat its purposes by providing loop holes for escape.
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
250. Products Liability Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660 (7th
Cir. 1982).
251. Before his elevation to the bench, Judge Posner analyzed the practice of judicial reliance
on precedent as follows:
It is the practice of deciding in accordance with precedent that makes decisions
operate as precedent. No matter how willful a judge is, he is likely to follow precedent to some extent, for if he did not the practice of decision according to precedent . . . would be undermined and the precedential significance of his own decision thereby reduced. There is, to be sure, a potentially serious free-rider problem.
The judge who disregards all precedents but his own may gain more utility in increased freedom to impose his personal preferences on the community than he loses
by contributing to a general erosion of the principle of adherence to precedent.
But the free-rider problem is held in check by the structure of appellate review.
• . . [A higher court's] power to review the decisions of the lower courts checks
any tendencies on the part of the lower-court judges to disregard precedent (reversal foils a judge's attempt to create his own precedent), and its own position in
the judicial hierarchy checks its members' tendencies in that direction.
J. Ehrlich & R. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,
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v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 2 as "belong[ing] to an era in Supreme Court
jurisprudence when the Court was concerned with the welfare of individual
competitors as well as with the health of the competitive process viewed as
a means of protecting consumers." 2 " ' Contrary to Judge Posner's belief, the
preservation of both competitors and competition is a legitimate and consistent goal of antitrust law.2"" Since the protection of competitors would be
incompatible with his legal theory that the sole aim of antitrust is the enhance-

ment of efficiency, he seemingly requires a choice to be made between protecting either competitors or competition."' By relegating the Court's decision in Klor's to a jurisprudential approach that he perceives is no longer
defensible, Judge Posner discards a finding of an illegal conspiracy to drive
out a plaintiff who was such a minute factor in the marketplace that its

absence could in no way affect market conditions." 6 Significantly, however,
the Supreme Court has neither implicitly nor explicitly overruled Klor's.

273 (1974).
Recently, in Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983), an interesting exchange
occurred between Judge Eschbach and Judge Posner on the nature of the precedential value
of United States Supreme Court decisions. Judge Eschbach wrote a concurring opinion especially
designed to respond to Judge Posner's "strongly worded dissenting opinion." Id. at 1441
(Eschbach, J., concurring). After describing a certain case that dealt with the property interest
in employment as "correctly decided," Judge Eschbach went on to explain:
When I say "correctly" decided, I mean that it was decided in accordance with
the authoritative pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court and remains
good law in light of subsequent precedent. Whether it was correctly decided in
some sort of ultimate jurisprudential or philosophical sense is not within my domain
as an intermediate appellate court judge once I have decided that it was properly
decided in the former sense. My brother Posner calls this approach to deciding
cases "putting the blame on the [Supreme] Court." ...
I call it adherence to
stare decisis and to a superior authority.
Id. (Eschbach, J., concurring).
252. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
253. 682 F.2d at 665 (7th Cir. 1982).
254. Although it has been repeatedly recognized that the antitrust laws protect competition,
and not competitors, competitive systems inherently require competitors. Hermann, Anti-trust
Law, 51 CMI-]KENT L. REV. 288, 300 (1974). An economy that is comprised of multiple competitors should not be preserved for nostalgic reasons; social and economic realities dictate
that certain industries will have fewer competitors. Yet, this fact of contemporary industry
does not lead to the conclusion that efficiency occurs only by concentration. Rather, when
there are a great number of effective competitors, downward pressure on price will occur, greater
diversity of ideas will be generated, and dispersion of economic and, hence, political power

will result. See generally Fox, Economic Concentration, Efficiency and Competition: Social
Goals and Political Choices, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET SYSTEM 137 (E.
Fox & J. Halverson ed. 1979).
255. Judge Posner's distaste for the preservation of competitors presumably derives from
his objection to "deviant" noneconomic objectives. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 31, at 18-22. Although noneconomic objectives historically have been recognized, they
are difficult to formulate into coherent legal criteria. Furthermore, the recognition of values
other than efficiency has made antitrust law an anticompetitive doctrine. Id. at 22 ("the scope
for judicial reform of antitrust doctrine is enormous").
256. The plaintiff in Klor's was a small retail appliance dealer which alleged that one of
its competitors had effectively conspired with 10 national appliance manufacturers which agreed
either not to sell to Klor's, or to sell to Klor's only at devastating prices. 359 U.S. at 208-09.
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C. Possible Trends of the Seventh Circuit
The manipulation of precedent illustrates the two divergent directions in
which the Seventh Circuit is moving. One direction leads to embracing the
Chicago school approach to antitrust resolution. Five months after Products
Liability was decided, Judge Posner cited that decision as the authoritative

definition of "competition in its antitrust sense." 2" As previously noted,
this definition is based purely on the economic theory that he personally
espouses. 2" Because competition is the explicit concern of antitrust laws, 2 "9
its legal definition determines the disposition of antitrust adjudication. By
defining competition exclusively as a technical economic term, the Seventh
Circuit has narrowed the scope of protection under the antitrust laws by

excluding the political and social objectives of the statutes.26 ° Such a contraction is unfortunate; it ignores the broad philosophical view of competition that lies outside the economists' thinking. Economists themselves cannot reach a consensus on the meaning of competition,26 and, even if they
could, the definition would fail to recognize some of the multifarious aspects
of the term.2" 2 The economic approach tends to disregard the ethical, legal,
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments that the absence of Klor's from the market was
of no economic consequence and that the boycott was reasonable. It was undisputed that there
were literally hundreds of other appliance retailers in the immediate vicinity of Klor's. Nevertheless, The Court held that the group boycott illegally inhibited Klor's's "freedom to buy
appliances in an open competitive market." Id. at 213. Group boycotts, the Court reaffirmed,
were in the "forbidden category." Id. at 212.
257. See Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982); accord
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1095 (7th Cir. 1982)
(citing Products Liability as "the sense of competition that is relevant to antitrust as currently
conceived").
258. See supra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (general objective of the antitrust laws is the promotion of free and open competition); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1956) (same).
260. For judicial recognition of the social and political objectives of antitrust law, see supra
notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
261. The inability of economic theory to develop a precise definition of competition is depicted
eloquently in the following pronouncement:
There is probably no concept in all of economics that is at once more fundamental
and pervasive, yet less satisfactorily developed, than the concept of competition.
Although the hesitance and inconsistency which has characterized the history of
American-competitive policy is doubtless partly due, as is often emphasized, to
the fact that competition is, in our system, a political and social desideratum no
less than an economic one, with some possible resulting conflict between these two
various values, surely it is due also to the failure of economics to define competition. Not the least among the many achievements of economic science has been
the ability to erect a rigorous analytical system on the principle of competition-a
principle so basic to economic reasoning that not even such powerful yet diverse
critics of orthodox theory as Marx and Keynes could avoid relying upon it-without
even clearly specifying what, exactly, competition is.
McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J. ECON. 639, 639 (1968).
262. See supra notes 234-47 and accompanying text.

19831

CONFIGURA TIONS OF ANTITRUST LA W

and social concepts that a humanistic approach to the law would recognize."'
In Sylvania, the Supreme Court stated that "[c]ompetitive economies have
social and political as well as economic advantages . . . but an antitrust
polity divorced from market considerations would lack any objective ben."' This statement has been used by Chicago school theorists
chmark ..
to support their position that the Court has embraced efficiency as the standard for antitrust adjudication.26 Although Sylvania supports a stronger position for economic theory in antitrust law, the decision merely concluded that
the economic benefits derived from using nonprice vertical market restraints

are sufficient to justify rejecting the per se illegality standard. 266 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has continued to apply per se illegal rules27 ' that disallow
26
any inquiry into the presumed economic justifications for the practice.

As the Court has recognized, "Per se rules thus require [the judiciary] to
make broad generalizations about the social utility of particular commercial
practices." 2 9 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit would have to reject all per
se illegality rules if efficiency becomes the standard for evaluating alleged
antitrust violations.2"'

The Seventh Circuit is also moving toward accepting the theoretical
postulates of Judge Posner. According to one of these postulates, efficiency
should be the sole standard in analyzing antitrust cases.2"' Judge Posner con263. Cf. J. BOULDINO, THE SKILLS OF THE ECONOMIST (1958) (economics is primarily interested
in commodities rather than human welfare).
264. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
265. See Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 12-13.
266. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum
fee setting agreements by member doctors held per se illegal).
268. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (vertical maximum pricefixing agreements held per se illegal over objection that they were not the "economic equivalent"
of minimum price fixing); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("Among
the practices which the Courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves
are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements."); Keifer-Stewart
Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (per se rule to maximum price fixing agreements
for "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of trader and thereby restrain
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgement"); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59, 226 (1940) (inquiry into the reasonableness of price-fixing
agreements is not permitted; all such agreements "are banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy").
269. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
270. By opting for an economic approach to antitrust law, the practices of "[tie-ins, reciprocal
buying, exclusive dealing, vertical mergers involving large market shares, [and] boycotts" would
logically become per se legal. Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 13. This conclusion is premised on the notion that by rejecting the per se illegal rule created in Schwinn,
the Supreme Court has chosen economic efficiency as the sole aim of antitrust. "To accept
that conclusion, one must believe that the Schwinn holding embraced the Brandeis-Hand interpretation [that the laws were designed to preserve a system of small entrepreneurs] exclusively,
and that the present Supreme Court necessarily adopted an opposing policy in overruling
Schwinn." Kellman, supra note 151, at 1111.
271. See Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 13.
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tends that acceptance of such a standard would create a more manageable
and coherent body of legal precedent.2" His descriptive use of economicsone which generates predictions of various courses of action from hypotheses
derived from microeconomic theory-is becoming the accepted antitrust doctrine of the Seventh Circuit.2"
In his academic writings that advance the jurisprudential value of economic
analysis,27 ' Judge Posner also has asserted a normative claim. He maintains
that because legal rules allocate the rights and duties of members of society,
the law should promote efficiency in order to maximize social welfare.27 5
Judge Posner defines efficiency as "exploiting resources in such a way that
human satisfactions as measured by aggregate willingness to pay .. .[are]
maximized." 2 6 Thus, in resolving legal disputes, the courts should attempt
to achieve the allocation of rights which will generate the greatest efficiency; such allocations would increase human satisfaction and, thereby, advance
society's wealth.2"
The justification for the normative assertion that efficiency should guide
legal resolutions invites several devastating criticisms. First, the notion that
welfare is identical to human satisfaction or desires ignores several important factors. One such factor, the distribution of income from which individuals derive their ability to purchase goods, may be unjust.27 8 Since willingness to pay supposedly measures human satisfaction, and in the aggregate
social welfare, 27 those with the greatest amount of wealth have the greatest
ability to pay. Rules that maximize wealth would therefore favor the wealthy
and, consequently, preserve the status quo.2"' In legal disputes, however,
272. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 212-17 (1976).
273. For example, the Seventh Circuit has begun to accept his definition of competition as
the standard for evaluating antitrust claims. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
274. Judge Posner's most profound work on the jurisprudential values of economic theory
is R. POSNER, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (1974).
275. For a development of the distinction between the normative and descriptive aspects of
economic analysis, see Posner, supra note 228, at 284-87.
276. R. POSNER, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 4 (1974).

277. Judge Posner attempted to develop wealth maximization as an ethical norm in Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979). His definition of
wealth is "the value in dollar or dollar equivalents . . .of everything in society." Id. at 119.
For an argument that wealth is not an ethical value, see Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD.

191 (1980).

278. See, e.g.. Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
939, 964 (1980) (with an explicit reliance on an existing distribution of wealth, one can critique
the efficiency criteria of economics if one finds current wealth distributions unjust). Judge Posner

notes that "willingness to pay is . . . a function of the existing distribution of income and
wealth in a society." R. POSNER, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 4.
279. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
280. Professor Morton J. Horwitz of Harvard Law School has identified the ramifications
of Judge Posner's assertion that wealth maximization should be the normative goal of judicial
decision making:
I also suppose that the shift from "efficiency" to "wealth maximization" is a
response to a decade of attacks on the claims of "efficiency" to scientific status.
For a long time, efficiency has been used in the economic analysis as if it were
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the divergence between social ideals and the existing social order is often
the cause of conflict. 28 ' Another related factor, which is ignored by the
criterion of efficiency, is that economics measures only market transactionswhat is bought and sold. Accordingly, economics relates to objects and not
to subjects. People's conscious wants, desires, or aspirations are ignored by
merely focusing on what they consume." As one critic of the normative
basis of economic theory declared, "The simple claim that the market maximizes value begs the question; it fails to justify the way or amount an individual's evaluation is weighed in determining value." 28' 3
Finally, equating welfare with the desire for commodities at a given price
ignores the fact that what is desired may not actually be in the best interests
of the individual or society. This criticism assumes that most desires are
socially learned and that a large part of the desire to consume is generated
by product advertisements. When a business advertises, its goal is to generate
sales in order to maximize profits-not to promote social welfare. 8 '
Whether the Seventh Circuit will embrace the normative claim of efficiency
(wealth maximization) has yet to be determined. If the court does, it must
recognize that efficiency is dependent on explicit assumptions about human
desires and specified factual circumstances.285 Judge Posner's transformation, from efficiency postulates to his repeated attempts at justifying the
normative validity of wealth maximization, reflects the transparency of his
claim that an economic approach to judicial decision making is a scientific
methodology. As Professor Horwitz concluded in one of his recent articles,
Judge Posner's shift from efficiency to wealth maximization
is the first time that I know of that Professor Posner has left the comforan independent concept, not entirely relative to whatever distribution of wealth
existed. And once it has been realized that efficiency is, by definition, a function
of a particular distribution (invariably the status quo), the inherently conservative
bias of the definition of efficiency becomes clear.
Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 911-12 (1980).
For another equally eloquent critique of wealth maximization, see Baker, supra note 278, at 957.
281. Cf. Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,
7 (1975) ("legal disputes in actual cases concern the parties' divergent claims of rights or denials
of duty" based on characteristics of a given situation).
282. Attempting to justify the claim that by concentrating on consumption, economics is
a powerful indication of human desires, Judge Posner declared that "[w]illingness to pay provides more credible evidence of preference than willingness to say." Posner, Economic Justice
and the Economist, 33 PuB. INTEREST 109, 114 (1973).
283. Baker, supra note 281, at 36.
284. Professor Baker has argued that product offerings are restricted to those that ensure
continuing control of resources in the hands of the existing owners. Because of limited alternatives, the consumers cannot be expected to promote welfare. Id. at 36 n.63.
285. See, e.g., Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212
(1981). Professor Tushnet argues that the Chicago school model uses unsupported abstractions.
"When the scientific pretensions of the Chicago approach are greatest, the analyst follows the
model of the physical scientist and adopts a large number of simplifying assumptions. The
purified system is then analyzed and predictions and explanations are generated. The real world,
however, is necessarily more complex .
" I.
Id.
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ting but dogmatic and parochial certainties of the scientist behind and attempted to engage in systematic social theory.
• . . The economic analysis of law, I believe, could maintain its prestige
only so long as it wrapped itself in the cloak of science. Once its practitioners
became overt apologists for a grossly unequal Distribution of Wealth, it
is only a matter of time before they are pluralistically assigned to the class
of one of the many "ideologies" from which one may pick and choose.
After twenty years of attempting to claim that they stood above ideology
in their devotion to science, the practitioners of law-and-economics have
finally been forced
to come out of the closet and debate ideology with
2 6
the rest of us. "

In the search for a valueless criterion by which to determine appropriate
business behavior, Judge Posner's embracement of efficiency must be
recognized as entailing a particular viewpoint based on a predetermined set
of priorities. 8 '
CONCLUSION

Before becoming a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, Richard A. Posner suggested that antitrust law was in need
of major reform.288 He maintained that the reforms should be accomplished
by judicial reevaluation of antitrust jurisprudence through the lens of
microeconomic price theory. According to Judge Posner:
The body of antitrust doctrine is largely the product of judicial interpretation of the vague provisions of the antitrust laws and thus can be changed
by the courts within the very broad limits set by the statutory language
and what we know of the intent behind it. What is required is judicial
recognition that many of the existing judge-made rules of antitrust are
inconsistent with the fundamental, and fundamentally economic, objectives of the antitrust law.2" 9

286. Horwitz, supra note 280, at 912. Professor Horwitz also maintained that
once the ground of debate shifts to social theory-as the cumulative assaults on
Posner's position finally have forced him to acknowledge-it is only a short time
before the main attraction of efficiency analysis-the promise of a single "scientific" right answer-will begin to fade into a quaint and nostalgic past.
Id. at 905.
287. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1, 12 (1980).

288. Judge Posner has professed that only abusive monopoly pricing and cartel arrangements
at a horizontal level (among competitors) would be illegal. This is because theoretically these
are the only dangerous business activities in a capitalistic society. Furthermore, according to
Chicago school theory, since cartels are inherently unstable it is only their short term effects
that must be guarded against. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 16-18.
Monopolies also are prone to market instability; if their profits are exorbitant, new firms will
enter the market (assuming few barriers to entry exist). Id. Consequently, decisions dealing
with criminal intent, see, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978);
tying and exclusive dealing arrangements, see, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958); and price/nonprice vertical restraints, see, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), would no longer be of antitrust concern. R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 225-26, 274-76, 201-13, 247-67.
289. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 31, at 7.
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This Comment has attempted to show that Judge Posner remains commit-

ted to radical revisions of antitrust law consistent with his personal view. 29
To accomplish these fundamental changes, Judge Posner has shown a willingness to ignore the scope of appellate review by presenting advisory conclusions on substantive antitrust issues.
The focus of this Comment generally has been on the procedural and
evidentiary rulings of Judge Posner in the antitrust context and on how these
"
rulings affect the substantive law of antitrust. 29
' The cumulative impact of

these rulings, subsequently applied and extended in a manner consistent with
the theoretical postulates of Judge Posner, is that antitrust plaintiffs must
be prepared to overcome a host of mechanisms explicitly designed to decrease
their success rate. 92 Because it is well recognized that the Reagan administration has systematically restricted the initiation of governmental enforcement
of many areas of antitrust law, private litigation assumes even more impor290. This Comment has attempted to draw a parallel between Judge Posner's academic writings
and his subsequent judicial opinions. In his judicial opinions, Judge Posner has the distinct
tendency to draw upon, and cite to, his own writings (both judicial and nonjudicial) and to
other Chicago school theorists' works. This reliance on an isolated school of thought is also
readily apparent in his writings as an academician. One renowned commentator highlighted
this tendency in reviewing The Economic Analysis of the Law:
[Wihat Posner has done is to capture in a single volume the rather distinctive
ideology which has tended to reflect itself in the intellectual activity of the University of Chicago Law School for the last twenty years or so.... [T]he analysis
of the controversial issues [in this book] is often short of persuasive. One flaw
in the analysis, as it seems to this reviewer, is a tendency of Posner to be doctrinaire. This tendency is fairly overt; Posner, with few exceptions, cites only his
colleagues at the University of Chicago or their students and associates.
Carrington, Book Review, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 187, 188.
291. Judge Posner depicts the legal system as "an instrument reflecting the objective of
economic efficiency." Hermann, Book Review, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 354, 371 (reviewing R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1974)). Professor Hermann stated:
Civil procedure is discussed from the viewpoint of maximizing efficiency of the
trial and encouraging settlement, thus reducing the overall cost of the judicial system.
Settlement is affected by the relative cost of settlement and litigation, the parties'
attitudes toward risk, and their evaluation of the likely outcome. All of these are,
of course, affected by the rules of pretrial procedure as well as the cost of litigation.
Id. at 371 n.102 (citations omitted).
Judge Posner once identified the relationship between procedural and substantive rules as
follows:
An important purpose of substantive legal rules . . . is to increase economic efficiency. It follows . . . that mistaken imposition of legal liability, or mistaken failure
to impose liability, will reduce efficiency. Judicial error is therefore a source of
social costs and the reduction of error is a goal of the procedural system.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371, 400-01 (1973). Thus, viewing procedural as well as substantive rules as capable
of enhancing efficiency, Judge Posner, through procedural rulings, is attempting to effectuate
his ideal that efficiency should be the sole aim of the antitrust laws.
292. Judge Posner once analyzed the effects of procedural and substantive rules on the expense
of litigation. Due to the fact that litigation is premised on "mutual optimism," that is, that
"both parties believe they have a good chance of winning," it follows that any change in
the substantive or procedural law that affects one of the parties' evaluations of its chance
of success will decrease the rate of litigation. Posner, supra note 291, at 417-19.
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tance as the vanguard of vigorous antitrust enforcement. Yet, due to the
antitrust decisions highlighted in this Comment, effective private enforcement of the antitrust laws is undermined. Thus, the current policies of the
Justice Department's antitrust division, combined with Judge Posner's assaults
on antitrust plaintiffs, evince a significant deterioration of antitrust enforcement within the Seventh Circuit's jurisdiction.
As an academician, Professor Posner was in the proper position to criticize
the inexactitude of the Supreme Court's antitrust decisions. The theoretical
hypothesis he presented to the legal community often served as the focal
point for debate among legal scholars. His criticism of the use of a per
se illegality standard to nonprice vertical restraints was cited with approval
by the Supreme Court in overturning that standard. 93 Nevertheless, one need
not contemplate too long on whether the Court has adopted his perspectives
on antitrust in toto; resoundingly, it has not.
Judge Posner's ultimate conclusion-that efficiency predictions should be
the basis for evaluating antitrust disputes 29 4-requi res complete relinquishment of recognized values incompatible with economic efficiency.29 The overriding premise of the Supreme Court's various interpretations of the antitrust
laws is that competition in the marketplace assures economic, political, and
social freedom.2 96 By promoting competition, the antitrust laws conform with
these broad objectives and ensure that the gap between the ideals of capitalism
and present-day reality does not become irreparable. Neither the Supreme
Court nor Congress has mandated that economic efficiency is the determinative value of the antitrust statues. 2'" Recently, however, the Seventh Cir293. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.13, 51 n.18, 53 n.21,
55, 56 & n.24 (1977) (citing Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court, supra note 31).
The Court noted that the "great weight of scholarly opinion" disapproved of the per se illegality
standard. Id. at 47-48.
Ironically, Posner had successfully argued on brief and before the Court for the government
in Schwinn, the case in which the per se illegality standard was established. See Brief for
Appellant, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). With respect to
these inapposite positions, Professor Posner responded that since the time of Schwinn, his
economics had taken a "180 turn." Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 31, at 2.
294. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra nole 31, at 4, 236.
295. Id.at 18-22.
296. For a discussion of the values associated with competition, see supra notes 236-43 and
accompanying text.
297. If, as can be assumed from the opening quotation of this conclusion, judges must interpret the will of Congress, then it appears that much of the complexity surrounding the antitrust statutes is due to the lack of a clear congressional intent. Judge Posner, however, relies
solely on Professor Bork's description of congressional intent in arguing that efficiency is the
singular intent underlying the Sherman Act. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 31, at 23 (citing Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 6 J. L.
& ECON. 7 (1966), for proposition that framers of Sherman Act were "concerned mainly with
the price and output consequences of monopolies and cartels"). There are major studies suggesting that no economic intent can be derived, and that Congress had strong social and political
objectives in enacting the Sherman Act. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, if efficiency is the goal of the antitrust statutes and the courts have deviated
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cuit has evinced a willingness to accept the efficiency standard of Chicago
school theory as articulated by the court's new colleague.2 98 It is urged that
the Seventh Circuit should remain more objective299 in its approach to the
antitrust statutes, the vitality and integrity of which must not be compromised
by blind adherence to a singular theoretical position."'
Jerry M. Santangelo
from that objective, then Congress could provide a remedy as suggested by President and Supreme
Court Chief Justice Taft:
[Ilt is impossible that such a function as [antitrust adjudication] could be performed
by judges, who are only men, without at times exceeding their just discretion, without
at times stepping over the line which is very hard to draw between judicial construction and judicial legislation. But it must always be remembered that the legislature
has complete power in this regard, and that if the courts in their construction of
law miss the intention of the legislation there is immediate relief at hand in a new
law which may be made more clearly to set forth the legislative will.
W. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1914).
298. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. But see MCI Communications Corp.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1177-79 (7th Cir. 1983) (Wood, J., dissenting).
Judge Harlington Wood dissented from the majority's adoption of the Areeda and Turner
rule for predatory pricing analysis because, in his opinion, the rule inappropriately considers
only certain limited economic criteria. After outlining the historically recognized social and
political goals of antitrust law, Judge Wood addressed the articulation of efficiency enhancement as the sole goal of antitrust jurisprudence.
With this rich history and jurisprudence stressing the wide-ranging social concern
of the antitrust laws, it is difficult to entirely understand the enthusiasm with which
many embrace the theory that these laws stand only for economic efficiency. Intellectual fashion no doubt plays a part. It is interesting to note in this connection
that the historical and jurisprudential arguments on behalf of this narrowed horizon
for the antitrust laws were not articulated with any coherence until the mid-1960's,
when the "law and economics" movement began to attain an economic foothold.
• . . While it is perhaps best left for legal historians to trace the intellectual origins
and impact of the "law and economics" approach, we note here only that it is
at most a set of contestable premises and certainly a relative newcomer to areas
marked by rich legislative and decisional history. While not negating the value of
policy arguments based on efficiency, I am hesitant to abandon the jurisprudence
and historical texture of the antitrust laws in order to embrace a set of seemingly
hard and fast efficiency rules which present an illusion of conceptual and empirical
tidiness.
Id. at 1179 (Wood, J., dissenting).
299. See generally Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908) (arguing
that scientific tools for attaining justice cannot make the law subservient to their insights).
300. It is fitting to end this Comment by quoting from a letter written by a former colleague
of Judge Posner's and published in the February 7, 1983, edition of the National Law Journal:
Since President Reagan has demonstrated no reluctance to appoint law professors
to the federal judiciary, it may be appropriate to take another look at the proper
role of the Senate in reviewing and approving these most important presidential
appointments. In particular, the question arises: to what extent should a person's
public expression of and commitment toward an ideology hostile to prevailing law
and public policy effectively preclude him from serving as a judge?
Part of the job of a law professor is to criticize and seek change. In fact, law
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professors often achieve prominence through their association with innovative reform
and more radical schools of thought. Yet the role of a federal judge is institutionally different, if for no other reason that to engender respect for the rule of
law-distinguishing our government system from others-among the public.
Perhaps most startling among this group of professor-judges is Richard A. Posner,
formerly a prolific University of Chicago law professor ...
Judge Posner's writing and consulting had long been known for its revisionist,
anti-populist critique of the existing body of antitrust legislation and Supreme Court
caselaw. Judge Posner's antitrust casebook had set forth and criticized 50 years
of Supreme Court antitrust boycott law as being too restrictive to business integration and not promoting economic efficiency.
Perhaps, therefore, it should have come as no surprise that Judge Posner's opinion in [Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083
(1982)] relied on his own views and ignored at least six relevant landmark Supreme
Court decisions, constituting the 50-year development of the law through the present day. ...
The Posner opinion in Marrese represents the imperial judiciary in its extreme.
The possibility of similar judicial nullification, based upon any ideology, should
be addressed specifically by the Senate in its confirmation hearings, at least where
the nominee is so publicly associated with an extralegal view of public policy.
National Law Journal, Feb. 7, 1983, at 12, col. 3 (quoted approvingly in Shafer v. Bulk Petroleum
Corp., 45 ANnTRUST TRADE & REG. REP. (BNA) 313, 314-15 n.4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 1983)).

